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ntebellum Americans anticipated contemporary political science 
when they complained about the tendency of embattled political 
elites to take refuge in the judiciary.  Recent scholarship on 
comparative judicial politics suggests that judicial review is a means 
by which constitutional framers provided protection for certain class 
interests that may no longer be fully protected in legislative settings.  
Tom Ginsburg claims, “[I]f they foresee themselves losing in 
postconstitutional elections,” the politicians responsible for the 
constitution “may seek to entrench judicial review as a form of 
political insurance.”1  Such a constitutional design ensures “[e]ven if 
they lose the election, they will be able to have some access to a 
forum in which to challenge the legislature.”2  In 1801, Thomas 
Jefferson foreshadowed this strategy.  He asserted that the defeated 
Federalist Party had “retired into the judiciary as a stronghold . . . and 
from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down 
and erased.”3  More than a half century later, Chief Justice David S. 
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1 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 18 (2003). 
2 Id. 
3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Dec. 19, 1801), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 301, 302 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903); see also 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joel Barlow (Mar. 14, 1801), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
A 
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Terry of the California Supreme Court repeated charges that judicial 
review in the United States provides politically unpopular factions 
with the institutional means for combating hostile electoral tides.4  
His dissenting opinion in Ferris v. Coover insisted, “The decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court” authorizing federal review of state 
court decisions “embody the political principles of a party which has 
passed away.”5  Recognizing “[t]he Legislative and Executive power 
of the Government had passed, or was rapidly passing into the hands 
of men entertaining opposite principles,” Justice Terry continued, 
persons affiliated with the soon-to-be defunct Federalist Party sought 
“by a course of judicial decisions to give direction to the future policy 
of the Union.”6  Prominent public law scholars, writing almost 150 
years later, christened this explanation of judicial empowerment as 
the “hegemonic preservation thesis”7 or “partisan entrenchment.”8  
“[W]hen their policy preferences have been, or are likely to be, 
increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-making arenas,” the 
leading contemporary champion of this perspective on judicial power 
asserts, “elites that possess disproportionate access to, and influence 
over, the legal arena may initiate a constitutional entrenchment of 
rights and judicial review in order to transfer power to supreme 
courts.”9  Jefferson and Terry would certainly agree. 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 222, 223.  Jefferson’s chief lieutenant in the Senate, 
William Branch Giles, had informed his commander six months earlier that “[t]he 
revolution [Republican success in 1800] is incomplete so long as that strong fortress [the 
Judiciary] is in possession of the enemy.”  3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN 
MARSHALL 22 (1919) (quoting Letter from William Branch Giles to Thomas Jefferson 
(June 1, 1802)) (second and third alterations in original); see also 1 CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 192–94 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter 1 
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT]; Letter from James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 
3, 1801), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE 261, 263–64 (Stanislaus Murray 
Hamilton ed., 1900). 
4 Ferris v. Coover, 11 Cal. 175, 183 (1858) (Terry, C.J., dissenting). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 184. 
7 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004).  For the influence of Hirschl’s “hegemonic 
preservation” thesis, see Ceren Belge, Friends of the Court: The Republican Alliance and 
Selective Activism of the Constitutional Court of Turkey, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 653, 657 
(2006); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their 
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 
513 (2002). 
8 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2001). 
9 HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 12. 
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“Insurance,” “hegemonic preservation,” “partisan entrenchment,” 
and related theses10 provide different explanations for the 
establishment and the expansion of judicial review than they give for 
the preservation of that constitutional power.  United political 
coalitions empower courts.  Diffuse political coalitions facilitate the 
maintenance of judicial authority.  Political scientists document how 
political leaders of dominant national coalitions establish and expand 
the judiciary’s authority to declare laws unconstitutional.  When a 
united coalition controls the national government, judicial 
empowerment facilitates the implementation of the coalition’s 
national policy in the hinterlands11 and is a long-term strategy for 
preserving power in the face of inevitable electoral weaknesses.12  
The Republican Party majorities in Congress that expanded the 
jurisdiction of federal courts in 1875 and in 1891 sought to limit 
populist legislation in the states and entrench Republican 
constitutional visions in the House of Representatives against 
incoming Democratic majorities.13  Once created, scholars note, 
judicial power no longer needs active legislative assistance.  Federal 
Justices retain the power to declare laws unconstitutional as long as 
either the once-dominant political elite or the new political sponsors 
for judicial authority retain sufficient control over national institutions 
to block hostile legislation aimed at courts.  Justices are relatively free 
to declare laws unconstitutional during periods when control over 
electoral institutions is divided because electoral coalitions are 
typically unwilling or unable to challenge judicial pretensions.  
“[P]olitical diffusion is good for judicial power,” Ginsburg notes.14  
He and other scholars observe how “[p]olitical diffusion creates more 
disputes for courts to resolve and hinders authorities from overruling 
or counterattacking courts.”15  Sometimes fragmentation facilitates 
alliances between some elected officials and Justices.  “Federalism, 
 
10 “Regime Politics” is becoming the buzzword in political science.  See generally J. 
Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and the Political Dynamics 
of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004). 
11 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, at viii 
(1981) (describing courts as institutions “by which central political regimes consolidate 
their control over the countryside”); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A 
Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1042–50 (1997). 
12 GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 18; see HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 12; Balkin & 
Levinson, supra note 8, at 1067–68. 
13 Gillman, supra note 7, at 516–17. 
14 GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 261. 
15 Id. 
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separation of powers, and the particular structure of the American 
party system,” Keith Whittington observes, “have played key roles in 
encouraging [P]residents to lend their support to the courts.”16  At 
other times, fragmentation inhibits efforts to change the course of 
judicial decisions.  Roe v. Wade17 remained good law during the late 
twentieth century because pro-life forces were never able to establish 
the enduring control over both the Senate and the White House 
necessary to place a fifth Justice on the Supreme Court who was on 
record as being opposed to abortion rights.18 
Constitutional authority, created by a unified political coalition, 
which subsequently feeds on political fragmentation, may be 
threatened by renewed unity in the elected branches of the national 
government.  Judicial review, as hegemonic preservation, seems 
particularly vulnerable when the elites responsible for judicial 
empowerment fall so far from political grace that they lose the power 
necessary to prevent rival legislative coalitions from challenging the 
authority of judicial holdovers from the previous regime.  Political 
transitions have proven too treacherous for activist judiciaries in 
many countries.  During the late twentieth century, governing 
officials in Europe and Asia overrode judicial decrees, abolished 
courts, and arrested judges once judicial rulings trenched too severely 
on core concerns of their electoral coalitions.19 
Analogous attacks on judicial power were unsuccessful in the 
United States,20 even during the youth and adolescence of the federal 
court system.  Apparent realignments, “moments of intense, 
comprehensive, and periodically recurring systemic change in 
 
16 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 
289 (2007). 
17 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
18 See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 127 (1996). 
19 Ran Hirschl, Beyond the American Experience: The Global Expansion of Judicial 
Review, in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 129, 142–44 
(Mark A. Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002) [hereinafter MARBURY VERSUS 
MADISON]. 
20 The repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 may be an exception to the statement in the 
text, although that repeal merely restored the judicial status quo.  The Judiciary Act of 
1862 may be a better example of a successful attack on the judiciary.  That measure 
adjusted the federal circuit court system, guaranteeing a Northern majority on the Supreme 
Court for the foreseeable future.  While not abolishing judicial power, the restructuring of 
the federal court system altered the beneficiaries of that practice. 
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American politics,”21 and reconstructive Presidents, who “shatter[ed] 
the politics of the past,”22 did little to diminish the judicial power to 
declare laws unconstitutional.  Political coalitions that included 
leading critics of judicial power failed to curb courts after taking 
power.  Jeffersonians did not successfully impeach Justice Samuel 
Chase in 1803,23 and, in 1831, Jacksonians lacked the votes to abolish 
the most important statutory foundation for federal judicial authority.  
President Roosevelt discovered that his landslide electoral victory in 
1936 did not provide adequate political foundations for challenging 
recalcitrant federal courts in 1937.24 
James Buchanan is often credited with being the unlikely savior of 
judicial review in early Jacksonian America.  In 1831, the House 
Judiciary Committee issued a report calling on Congress to repeal 
section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.25  That provision authorized 
the Supreme Court to review state court decisions upholding state 
laws against federal constitutional attack, declaring federal laws 
unconstitutional, or rejecting claims of federal constitutional right.26  
Repeal, for all practical purposes, would have abolished federal 
judicial review of state laws and severely curtailed federal judicial 
review of national laws.27  Buchanan, then a congressional 
representative from Pennsylvania, issued a minority report, on behalf 
of himself and the two other dissenting members of the House 
 
21 Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Realignment: Dead or Alive?, in THE END OF 
REALIGNMENT?: INTERPRETING AMERICAN ELECTORAL ERAS 101, 115 (Byron E. Shafer 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter Burnham, Critical Realignment]. 
22 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 33 (1993). 
23 The best study of the Chase impeachment is Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the 
Federal Judiciary: The Chase Impeachment and the Constitution, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
55 (1995). 
24 The classic study of the “Court-packing” plan is WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE 
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF 
ROOSEVELT 82–162 (1995). 
25 Report Upon the Judiciary, 7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxvii (1831). 
26 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (1789). 
27 Many antebellum lawsuits challenging federal laws were initiated in state courts.  To 
the extent state court decisions could not be appealed to the Supreme Court, federal courts 
would lose control over the authority to determine whether federal laws were 
constitutional.  See infra notes 95–98.  In fact, section 25 limited federal court control by 
permitting appeal only when the state court declared a federal law unconstitutional.  § 25, 
1 Stat. at 85–86; see also Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: 
Political Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 13 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992). 
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Judiciary Committee, criticizing the proposed repeal of section 25.28  
His analysis is generally credited with convincing a skeptical 
Congress that fundamental constitutional norms required federal 
judicial oversight of state courts and state legislatures.  “[I]t was 
largely due to [Buchanan’s] efforts,” Charles Warren writes, “that the 
[repeal] bill was finally defeated.”29  Felix Frankfurter and James 
Landis regard Buchanan’s defense of federal judicial authority as 
“one of the famous documents of American constitutional law.”30 
Why judicial review survived the Jacksonian Revolution and what 
motivated Jacksonian politicians such as Buchanan to support federal 
judicial authority remains remarkably under-theorized.  The most 
important study on the politics of federal jurisdiction before the Civil 
War, Charles Warren’s magisterial “Legislative and Judicial Attacks 
on the Supreme Court of the United States—A History of the Twenty-
Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act,” was published in 1913.  That 
essay devoted only a paragraph to the effort to repeal section 25 in 
1831.31  Warren cited numerous instances when “Old Republicans” 
and radical Jacksonians proposed court-curbing measures but made 
little effort to explain why those attempts failed to curtail federal 
judicial power.  He concluded with the bald assertion: “[T]here has 
been entire acquiescence by the States and by the people in the 
jurisdiction granted to the Supreme Court by the United States 
Constitution.”32  No explanation was given for this acquiescence.  
The literature on realignment is no more instructive on the survival of 
judicial review in Jacksonian America.  Walter Dean Burnham claims 
that “the outbreak of political conflict over the Supreme Court’s role 
and decisions” is an important manifestation of an impending political 
 
28 Counter Report Upon the Judiciary, 7 REG. DEB. app. at lxxxi (1831). 
29 Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United 
States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act (pt. 2), 47 AM. L. REV. 
161, 164 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks (pt. 2)]; see also 
Wilfred Feinberg, Constraining “The Least Dangerous Branch”: The Tradition of Attacks 
on Judicial Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 252, 259 (1984); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist 
Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 882 n.149 (1997) (“Buchanan’s 
dissent was so persuasive that the full House overwhelmingly rejected the bill.”). 
30 FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: 
A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 44 n.143 (1928); see also 1 WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 739; Akhil Reed Amar, Taking Article III Seriously: A 
Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 442, 450 (1991). 
31 Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks (pt. 2), supra note 29, at 164. 
32 Id. at 189. 
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transition.33  He refers to Jacksonian efforts to “curb the Court” as 
evidence that a realignment took place in “the period 1827–35.”34  
Burnham does not explain why such an important marker of the 
political disruptions of the early Jacksonian period—court-curbing—
nevertheless failed. 
This Article claims that federalism and political fragmentation 
were more responsible than James Buchanan for the failed repeal of 
section 25, for the maintenance of judicial power in the United States 
during the transition from National Republican rule to Jacksonian 
democracy that took place during the 1820s and 1830s, and for the 
maintenance of judicial power in the United States during other 
political transitions.  The congressional vote on the House Judiciary 
Report proposing the repeal and contemporaneous newspaper 
responses to that proposal indicate that, outside of political actors 
residing in the handful of states with immediate reasons for curtailing 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, most Americans supported the 
Supreme Court’s power to declare federal and state laws 
unconstitutional.  The Marshall Court enjoyed popular support during 
the 1820s because that tribunal’s most important decisions targeted 
state laws that were inconsistent with policies favored by national 
elites.35  Americans did not repudiate the Marshall Court’s 
constitutional vision by electing Andrew Jackson in 1828.  Jackson 
rode to power on the back of a geographically diverse coalition 
composed of members who sharply disputed the constitutionality of 
the national bank, protective tariffs, and other matters that had been 
adjudicated, or were likely to be adjudicated, by federal courts in the 
near future.  Members of a badly fragmented political coalition, 
radical Jacksonians could not even gain a majority of Jacksonian 
votes for curbing judicial power in 1831.  When Jacksonians reached 
a consensus that the national bank and protective tariffs were 
unconstitutional during the late 1830s, no pressing need existed to 
limit the power of a Supreme Court that, by then, was staffed by a 
Jacksonian majority committed to the Jacksonian constitutional 
vision. 
The Jacksonian experience highlights how political diffusion helps 
preserve judicial power both during periods of political stability, 
 
33 Burnham, Critical Realignment, supra note 21, at 124. 
34 Id. 
35 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also infra notes 153–57 and accompanying text. 
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when no existing coalition fully controls the national government, and 
during periods of political reconstruction or realignment, when a new 
coalition gains control of the national government.  Political scientists 
have detailed that elected officials have a tendency to foist 
responsibility for constitutional decisions on courts during times when 
there is no constitutional consensus in the elected branches of a 
national government.  Persons opposed to the direction of judicial 
decisions at those times lack the power to reverse the courts.36  As 
events from 1828 to 1837 demonstrate, political diffusion is also 
“good for judicial power” during the political transitions that take 
place while a new dominant coalition is consolidating power.  The 
more power is diffused, the greater the challenges of putting together 
a partisan coalition that shares a coherent constitutional vision.  The 
greater the difficulty of unifying a dominant national coalition, the 
longer the time necessary to gain the control over the elected branches 
of the national government necessary to curb contrary judicial 
pretensions.  Basically, when a new ruling coalition first comes to 
power, the party is likely to lack the necessary unity or control over 
national institutions to attack a judiciary still committed to inherited 
constitutional visions.  By the time the coalition becomes sufficiently 
united and powerful, the combination of deaths, resignations, and new 
judicial appointments is likely to make attacks on judicial power 
unnecessary.  Put more simply, the more power is diffused, the less 
likely that, at some point in a political transition, the emerging 
coalition will have adequate control of all electoral institutions during 
the time it has inadequate control of the courts. 
Once a new, cohesive national coalition gains the control over the 
federal government necessary to alter judicial power, expansion and 
hegemonic preservation are likely to be better political strategies for 
realizing their constitutional vision than court-curbing proposals.  The 
surviving Justices who most need curbing after a political coalition 
has consolidated are likely to be speaking only when dissenting from 
opinions penned by Justices who share the new regime’s 
constitutional commitments.  More often than not, during the later 
stages of a political transition, the judiciary is likely to be a vital 
presidential ally against a recalcitrant Congress.  Presidents typically 
play the crucial role in political reconstructions.  “Disruption of the 
status quo ante,” Stephen Skowronek explains, “is basic to the politics 
 
36 See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the 
Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 59–60 (1993).  See generally WHITTINGTON, supra 
note 16, at 82–229. 
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presidents make.”37  Presidents also typically have more influence 
than legislators on the staffing of federal courts.  Presidents tend to 
nominate Justices whom they believe share their constitutional 
vision.38  Senators tend to confirm the President’s nominees whom 
they believe are competent and not ideological extremists.39  As a 
result, the Supreme Court is likely to be politically closer to the 
President than the median member of the House of Representatives or 
the Senate.40  By 1840, the Taney Court was more reliably Jacksonian 
than the Congress.  When Roosevelt left office, the Supreme Court 
was far more committed to the constitutional vision underlying the 
New Deal than either the House or the Senate.  Given the special 
presidential role in political reconstructions and in reconstructing the 
federal courts, a high probability exists that the federal judiciary will 
become committed to the President’s constitutional agenda before, or 
at approximately the same time as, the Congress.  When the new 
dominant coalition finally captures control of the national legislature, 
therefore, its constitutional commitments will best be promoted by 
legislation expanding the authority of an already friendly judiciary. 
My claim that new political coalitions are likely to have immediate 
reasons for expanding judicial power, once they both reach a 
consensus on constitutional goals and control all elected branches of 
government, differs from William Lasser’s more strategic explanation 
for the survival of judicial review during periods of political 
transitions.41  Lasser asserts that the leaders of emerging popular 
majorities have sometimes behaved tactically, preferring to tolerate 
judicial challenges to cherished policies in the present for the prospect 
of a powerful judiciary stacked with their partisans in the future.42  
Because reconstructive Presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln and 
Franklin Roosevelt, “remained essentially friendly to the idea of a 
strong federal judiciary exercising power on behalf of a powerful 
 
37 SKOWRONEK, supra note 22, at 4. 
38 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II, at 52–56 (5th 
ed. 2008); LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 130–35 (2005). 
39 Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover & Jeffrey A. Segal, Senate Voting on Supreme 
Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 530–31 (1990). 
40 See Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative 
Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675, 691 (2006). 
41 WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 258 (1988). 
42 See id. at 258–59. 
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national government . . . [and expected] the Court [to] become their 
ally in the long run,” he states, “they set out not to destroy the Court 
but only to capture it.”43 
James Buchanan did not make such an appeal to the future in 1831 
when he sought to maintain section 25.  Buchanan urged Jacksonians 
and National Republicans to preserve the power of a judiciary 
committed, at the time, to the constitutionality of the national bank 
and protective tariffs because, for the time being, he and a majority of 
the representatives in Congress favored these initiatives.  By the time 
Buchanan and other northern Democrats abandoned their 
commitment to the national bank and protective tariffs, so too had the 
Supreme Court. 
The following pages explore how judicial review survived the 
transition from the deferential politics of the National 
Republican/Federalist era to the partisan politics of Jacksonian 
America.  Part I details the political foundations of federal judicial 
power, particularly the crucial role section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 played in establishing and maintaining the Supreme Court’s 
power to declare state—and federal—laws unconstitutional.  Part II 
explains why the transition from Federalist to National Republican 
rule during the beginning of the nineteenth century posed little threat 
to judicial authority.  Part III discusses the Jacksonian challenge to 
federal judicial power, why that challenge failed in 1831, and why 
that challenge was largely abandoned by 1837.  Part IV points out 
how political fragmentation explains the failure of both the 
Jacksonian challenge to judicial power and the subsequent attacks on 
the judiciary in American history.  This analysis concludes that 
judicial review is likely to become a permanent feature of the 
constitutional landscape once established in a polity where power is 
almost always fragmented. 
Perceptions of judicial weakness during crucial junctures of 
American history are rooted in realignment theory,44 which is 
currently being discarded by students of American political 
development.45  Realignment theorists contended that American 
politics was structured by sharp alterations in partisan control of 
 
43 Id. at 258. 
44 The seminal statement of realignment theory is Burnham, Critical Realignment, 
supra note 21, at 101–03.  For a good summary of the literature on realignment, see 
DAVID R. MAYHEW, ELECTORAL REALIGNMENTS: A CRITIQUE OF AN AMERICAN GENRE 
1–33 (2002). 
45 The most important criticism is found in MAYHEW, supra note 44, at 34–140. 
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national institutions that tended to take place on a cycle of 
approximately thirty years.  One or two national elections were 
sufficient to replace one majority with a new majority committed to a 
very different constitutional vision.  Federal courts were presumed to 
be particularly less vulnerable during these rapid transitions, as the 
judiciary was the only national institution whose members were 
immune from the immediate effects of the electoral tide.46  A united 
coalition in the elected branches of government, conventional wisdom 
indicated, could not achieve goals unless adherents of the old order in 
the judiciary could be immediately replaced or induced to change 
course.  “In the course of establishing their own constitutional 
vision,” Whittington asserts, reconstructive “[P]residents must 
necessarily shatter previously established constitutional 
understandings laid down by the Court.”47 
This realignment synthesis no longer seems to describe American 
politics.  Political scientists at the dawn of the twenty-first century 
now depict numerous, partly autonomous government institutions, 
each of which has a partly autonomous developmental trajectory.48  
The buzzword to describe this phenomenon is “intercurrence.”49  In a 
political universe characterized by intercurrence, sharp shifts do not 
simultaneously occur in all elected institutions.  At most, the House of 
Representatives, the Senate, the President, and the federal courts may 
be moving in similar, although not identical, ideological directions at 
very different speeds.  By the time all the electoral “ducks are in 
line,” if that ever occurs, the same phenomenon is likely to move the 
Supreme Court to a place where at least some crucial members of the 
dominant national coalition are more inclined to see the Justices as 
their allies against members of their coalition who have somewhat 
different beliefs. 
The evidence from 1831 and other years suggests that judicial 
power thrives in a political environment characterized more by 
intercurrence than realignment.  In political environments 
characterized by intercurrence, the political institutions that must 
unite for a successful challenge to federal courts are rarely on the 
same page.  Challenges to judicial authority occur more frequently 
 
46 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 28–81. 
47 Id. at 77. 
48 See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 108–18 (2004). 
49 Id. at 108. 
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because, in a world of relatively autonomous elected branches of 
national government, at least one branch is likely to be seriously at 
odds with decision-making trends on the Supreme Court.  These more 
frequent challenges are also likely to fail because other elected 
branches of the national government are more likely to be moving in 
step with the judicial majority than the challenging branch.  Southern 
Jacksonians learned, to their sorrow, that the political transformations 
that gave them the power to elect one of their own as Speaker of the 
House were not sufficient to align the rest of the Congress against the 
Supreme Court in 1831. 
I 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
A.  Some Basics 
Judicial authority has political foundations.50  Justices only have 
the power to declare laws unconstitutional, in a politically significant 
sense,51 when the following occur: a judicial system is established, 
that judicial system is staffed, the courts are vested with jurisdiction 
over cases raising constitutional questions, litigants actually raise 
claims challenging the constitutionality of official actions, judges 
possess the resources necessary to resolve constitutional disputes in a 
timely and intelligent manner, outsiders do not exercise undue 
influence over judges considering constitutional issues, and judicial 
decisions declaring laws unconstitutional are obeyed.52  These 
prerequisites for judicial review require legislation and executive 
power.53  Justices do not create judicial systems.54  Federal judicial 
review did not exist in the Confederacy because, although the 
Confederate Constitution called for the establishment of a Supreme 
Court, “the prevailing political determination [was] to leave the 
Supreme Court [of the Confederate States of America] 
 
50 See Mark A. Graber, The Law and Politics of Judicial Review, in SEPARATION OF 
POWERS: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 49, 54 (Katy J. Harriger ed., 2003).  See 
generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 16. 
51 Most persons above the age of three can utter the declaratory statement: “This law is 
unconstitutional.” 
52 Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judiciary Act of 
1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 618–22 (2003). 
53 See id. at 618. 
54 Id. 
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unorganized.”55  Action by elected officials is often necessary to 
ensure that judicial authority is not compromised by outside threats to 
judicial personnel or litigants.  State failure to redress private violence 
during the Jim Crow era prevented numerous persons of color from 
litigating constitutional claims in the Deep South.56 
The political foundations of judicial authority suggest political 
explanations for the power to declare laws unconstitutional.  Rather 
than parse only legal texts for the origins of judicial review, scholars 
should also determine why elected officials empowered courts to 
ignore or strike down legislative acts.  “For constitutions and 
institutions like judicial review to exist in historical reality and be 
more than imagined moral abstractions,” Keith Whittington observes, 
“there must be political reasons for powerful political actors to 
support them over time.”57  That Justices exercise the power to 
declare laws unconstitutional when given legal and political 
opportunities, while not unproblematic, is not surprising.  
Determining what motivates national legislators and chief executive 
officials to provide Justices with those legal and political 
opportunities is more difficult.  Legislative majorities seemingly have 
strong incentives to limit judicial authority if, as Alexander Bickel 
famously maintained, “when the Supreme Court declares 
unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, 
it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here 
and now.”58 
Contemporary scholarship has documented numerous legislative 
motivations for empowering federal courts.  Judicial review in 
practice is not nearly as countermajoritarian as Bickel suggested.  
Courts serve the interests of at least some members of the dominant 
national coalition when Justices strike down state laws that are 
inconsistent with national constitutional visions, declare politics 
enacted by a previous regime unconstitutional, and resolve political 
controversies that cut across existing political coalitions.59  Elected 
 
55 MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861: AN INQUIRY 
INTO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 104 (1991). 
56 See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 82–83 (2d ed. 2008). 
57 See WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 4. 
58 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962). 
59 Scholarship on the political construction of judicial power has become a major 
growth industry in political science.  See, e.g., HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 11–12; GEORGE 
I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND 
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officials probably have less self-interested motives when expanding 
or preserving judicial power.  Broad agreement exists in the United 
States both that Marbury v. Madison was correctly decided and that 
judicial review is a necessary component of constitutional 
government.60  At the very least, such beliefs likely create a political 
presumption in favor of judicial authority, which inhibits court-
curbing actions, unless the provocation is particularly strong. 
These political foundations and explanations highlight the 
importance of the various judiciary laws that national officials have 
debated and enacted throughout American history.  These measures 
play at least as important a role as judicial opinions in establishing, 
maintaining, and expanding judicial power.  Measures such as the 
Judiciary Act of 1789,61 the Judiciary Act of 1837,62 the Judiciary 
Act of 1875,63 the Judiciary Act of 1891,64 and the Judiciary Act of 
192565 created the federal court system, provided for the appointment 
of Justices, and vested federal courts with jurisdiction over 
constitutional cases.  The debates over whether to pass and maintain 
these Acts are probably the most important source for determining 
why elected officials empower courts.  As Charles Fairman astutely 
noted, “The historian of the Court should keep his watch in the halls 
of Congress.”66  Fairman’s advice, forgotten by most of the grand 
constitutional theorists of the late twentieth century, was gospel 
before the Civil War. 
 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1–41 (2003); KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING 
ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 6–20, 144–
50, 205–21 (2004); WHITTINGTON, supra note 16, at 1–27; Paul Frymer, Acting When 
Elected Officials Won't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor 
Unions, 1935–85, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483, 484 (2003); Gillman, supra note 7, at 511; 
Graber, supra note 36, at 65–68.  For one summary of this literature, see Mark A. Graber, 
Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005). 
60 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 24–25 (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE 
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33–34 (1996). 
61 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
62 Judiciary Act of 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176 (1837). 
63 Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). 
64 Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). 
65 Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (1925). 
66 CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, RECONSTRUCTION AND 
REUNION, 1864–88, pt. 1, at 118 (1971). 
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B.  Political Foundations in the United States 
The basic foundations for the judicial power to declare laws 
unconstitutional in the United States were initially established by the 
ratifiers of the Constitution of the United States.  Article III, Section 2 
asserts, “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution.”67  While not stating so 
explicitly, this provision could plausibly be interpreted as authorizing 
federal courts to declare laws unconstitutional.68  The Supremacy 
Clause, which asserts that “[t]his Constitution . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land,” provides a second textual foundation for 
judicial review.69  This seems to have been the original expectation of 
most framers who discussed judicial review during the framing and 
ratification process.70 
The First Congress provided more explicit foundations for judicial 
power by passing the Judiciary Act of 1789.  In sharp contrast to the 
Constitution, that measure plainly empowers the Supreme Court to 
declare state and federal laws unconstitutional.  Any state court 
decision that either holds that a federal law or treaty is 
unconstitutional, determines that a state law is constitutional, or 
rejects a claim of federal constitutional or statutory right “may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”71  Other provisions of the Judiciary Act provide 
necessary prerequisites for judicial power.  In 1789, Congress 
determined the number of federal Justices, required federal courts to 
hold regular sessions for hearing and deciding cases, provided the 
court with personnel and processes that both assisted judicial decision 
making and facilitated the implementation of judicial decisions, 
created federal officers who could litigate constitutional issues before 
the Supreme Court, and authorized salaries for various judicial 
officers.72  The congressional decision to vest state courts with 
original jurisdiction over most claims based on federal constitutional 
law may have furthered federal judicial power by making 
 
67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
68 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178–79 (1803). 
69 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1959). 
70 See MARBURY VERSUS MADISON, supra note 19, at 235–37. 
71 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (1789). 
72 Id. §§ 1–35, 1 Stat. at 73–93. 
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constitutional litigation more convenient and less expensive.73  Had 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 or a similar proposal failed to become 
federal law, subsequent debates over judicial review and judicial 
supremacy would have been purely speculative. 
Marbury v. Madison and related cases that asserted a judicial 
power to declare laws unconstitutional did little more than announce a 
judicial willingness to exercise the power granted by Congress in 
1789.74  In 1803, the Justices made no short-term contribution to the 
political authority of federal courts.  At best, the Marshall Court may 
have preserved a preexisting judicial power by not handing down a 
decision that might have provoked hostile officials in the Jefferson 
administration.75  Marshall’s opinion did not even make an original 
contribution to the intellectual case for judicial review.  The Marbury 
opinion largely repeats the main arguments of The Federalist Number 
78,76 Justice William Paterson’s opinion in Vanhorne’s Lessee v. 
Dorrance,77 and, most substantively, claims leading Federalists made 
during the debate over the Repeal Act of 1802.78 
To the extent that Marbury provided legal foundations for a 
judicial power beyond that found in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Marshall did so by asserting that Justices could declare official 
actions unconstitutional whenever they had jurisdiction over a case—
or when deciding whether jurisdiction had been constitutionally 
 
73 See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 455–56 (1989); James E. Pfander, Marbury, 
Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1515, 1519 (2001). 
74 Marbury was not the first federal court decision that indicated federal courts had the 
power to declare laws unconstitutional.  See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
40, 53 (1851) (discussing United States v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794)); Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 
(1795); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792); United States v. Callender, 25 F. 
Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).  See generally Scott Douglas Gerber, The 
Myth of Marbury v. Madison and the Origins of Judicial Review, in MARBURY VERSUS 
MADISON, supra note 19, at 11–13; Graber, supra note 52, at 626–27. 
75 See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25–27 (Sanford 
Levinson ed., 3d ed. 2000); Mark A. Graber, The Problematic Establishment of Judicial 
Review, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
INTERPRETATIONS 28, 36 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999). 
76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
77 2 U.S (2 Dall.) 304, 309–15 (1795). 
78 See, e.g., 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 25–30, 32–34, 38, 39, 48, 50, 56–59, 61–63, 73–75, 
83, 89, 91, 105, 115–16, 131–32, 163–67, 171, 175–76, 178–82, reprinted in MARBURY 
VERSUS MADISON, supra note 19, at 310, 310–15 [hereinafter Senate Debate over the 
Repeal Act]. 
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vested.79  The text of section 25 of the Judiciary Act empowers the 
Supreme Court to declare federal and state laws unconstitutional only 
when reviewing state court decisions.80  The Judiciary Act did not 
explicitly state whether Justices could declare laws unconstitutional 
when exercising original jurisdiction or adjudicating appeals from the 
lower federal courts.  As further developed in United States v. 
Klein,81 Marbury established that courts must consider the 
Constitution and all other relevant legal sources whenever they 
exercise jurisdiction.  Marshall argued that it was “too extravagant to 
be maintained” that “a case arising under the [C]onstitution should be 
decided without examining the instrument under which it arises.”82  
Congress, in this view, vests Justices with the power to declare laws 
unconstitutional whenever it grants courts the jurisdiction necessary 
to adjudicate particular disputes about that law.  The specific 
language in section 25 authorizing the Supreme Court to sustain state 
court decisions declaring federal laws unconstitutional was 
unnecessary.  The national legislature may not vest federal courts 
with jurisdiction to decide a class of cases, while also prohibiting the 
Justices from relying on some otherwise relevant fact or law.  As 
Chief Justice Salmon Chase declared in Klein, “[T]he legislature may 
[not] prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the 
government in cases pending before it.”83 
The Marbury/Klein principle was controversial in 1803.  Prominent 
Jeffersonians challenged the link between jurisdiction and judicial 
review during the debate over proposed repeal of the Judiciary Act of 
1801.84  Many insisted that the Supreme Court lacked the power to 
ignore federal laws when exercising legislatively mandated appellate 
jurisdiction.  “To declare a law null and void,” Representative Philip 
R. Thompson of Virginia declared, “is certainly not such a case, either 
in law or equity, arising under the Constitution.”85  In Marbury, Chief 
 
79 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
80 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (1789). 
81 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
82 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 179. 
83 Klein, 80 U.S. at 146. 
84 See, e.g., Senate Debate over the Repeal Act, supra note 78, at 310–15; 11 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 529–33, 536, 542–44, 552–54, 556–58, 567–68, 574–76, 595–96, 614–15, 645–
48, 650, 661–62, 689–91, 698–702, 727–28, 739–41, 743, 747–48, 754–57, 759–60, 783–
87, 823–24, 826, 841–42, 859, 861, 865–66, 875, 876, 879–81, 884, 903–05, 918–32, 935, 
940–41, 947–48, 973, 982–83 (1802), reprinted in MARBURY VERSUS MADISON, supra 
note 19, at 315, 315–28. 
85 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 553 (1802). 
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Justice Marshall successfully resisted this effort to limit federal 
judicial authority. 
Marbury did not challenge the more important principle that 
legislatively conferred jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the judicial 
power to declare laws unconstitutional.  In antebellum America, 
federal jurisdiction existed largely at congressional discretion.  Both 
the Ellsworth and Marshall Courts sapped Marbury of any substantial 
influence on the legal foundations of judicial power by holding that 
courts could adjudicate appeals only when federal law permitted the 
exercise of jurisdiction.  In Wiscart v. Dauchy, the Ellsworth Court 
asserted, “If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our 
proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction.”86  
Marshall endorsed this sentiment shortly after handing down 
Marbury.  The “affirmative description” of jurisdiction laid out in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court in Durousseau v. United States 
declared, “has been understood to imply a negative on the exercise of 
such appellate power as is not comprehended within it.”87 
This restriction of federal judicial power remained good law 
throughout the Jacksonian era and the Reconstruction.  Robert N. 
Clinton thoroughly documents how “federal judicial authority [under 
Taney and Chase] was a more fragile creature of statutory grace, 
owing its life-blood to the largess of Congress.”88  Taney Court 
Justices consistently maintained that federal appellate jurisdiction was 
given by the national legislature and, therefore, could be taken away 
by the same legislature.  “‘[T]he disposal of the judicial power 
(except in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress[,] and 
Congress is not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts 
to every subject, in every form which the Constitution might 
warrant.’”89  Justice Peter Daniel ruled that “the judicial power of the 
United States . . . is . . . dependent for its distribution . . . entirely upon 
the action of Congress.”90  “Congress,” his majority opinion 
 
86 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796). 
87 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810); see also United States v. Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 108 (1812) (finding that the Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction in the 
absence of legislation). 
88 Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early 
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 
1608 (1986). 
89 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (quoting Turner v. Bank of North 
America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799)). 
90 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). 
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concluded, could “withhold . . . jurisdiction from [federal courts] in 
the exact degrees and character which . . . may seem proper for the 
public good.”91  The Chase Court’s decision to forego deciding Ex 
parte McCardle92 while Congress considered stripping jurisdiction 
was an application of the longstanding principle that federal judicial 
appellate review existed at legislative whim.93 
Wiscart and Durousseau reduced Marbury to near-insignificance 
as an adequate legal foundation for judicial review.  Most 
controversial and politically important Supreme Court decisions 
before the Civil War were exercises of appellate jurisdiction.  Had 
Congress not provided for federal appellate jurisdiction, Supreme 
Court Justices, following the Ellsworth and Marshall Court 
precedents, would have been legally compelled to refrain from 
handing down constitutional decisions in such cases as Fletcher v. 
Peck,94 McCulloch v. Maryland,95 Gibbons v. Ogden,96 and Dred 
Scott v. Sandford.97  Some doctrine suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction was also subject to legislative whims.  In 
Marbury v. Madison, the Court held that Congress could not add to 
the constitutionally prescribed original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court.98  Cohens v. Virginia permitted state courts to exercise original 
jurisdiction in cases that Article III established as part of the original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.99  Perhaps Congress could further 
reduce federal judicial power, if it so desired, by first permitting state 
courts to adjudicate cases in which the Constitution proclaimed the 
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction and then not vesting federal 
courts with the power to hear appeals from these local decisions.100  
 
91 Id.; see also Clinton, supra note 88, at 1589–92. 
92 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
93 See Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide During 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 33, 34 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006). 
94 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
95 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
96 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
97 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
98 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–76 (1803). 
99 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 394–402 (1821). 
100 Cohens was a case that fit this description, and Virginia vigorously objected to 
federal judicial authority to review that case.  A longstanding debate exists over the extent 
to which Congress may fully strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction over cases raising 
constitutional issues.  The seminal discussion of this issue is Henry M. Hart, Jr., The 
 114 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 95 
Such a law, which seems consistent with Wiscart, would have 
effectively fulfilled Mark Tushnet’s hope that the Constitution be 
taken from the Supreme Court101 without overruling Marbury.102 
In conjunction, Wiscart and Marbury help explain why most 
opponents of judicial review before the Civil War did not complain 
that federal judicial review, particularly federal judicial review of 
state laws, was countermajoritarian.103  To the extent section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act provided the crucial legal and political foundations for 
federal judicial authority, the exercise of that judicial authority was no 
more countermajoritarian than the exercise of any other statutorily 
delegated power by an unelected federal official.  Legislative 
majorities opposed either to the trend of judicial decisions or to 
judicial power in principle could practically abolish federal judicial 
review by eliminating the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  
Antebellum opponents of judicial authority understood the basic 
structure of that authority.  Most complained about “consolidation,” 
not minority rule.104  Their resentments were typically directed at 
federal power generally and were often expressed after the Supreme 
Court sustained Federalist or National Republican measures.  Senator 
Robert Hayne observed in his attack on federal judicial power during 
his famous debates with Daniel Webster: “If the will of a majority of 
Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the 
[C]onstitution is a dead letter.”105  Federal review of state legislation 
subverted constitutional limitations, John C. Calhoun agreed, because 
“[t]he judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this 
united majority, as the majority of Congress itself.”106 
Recognizing the statutory foundations of federal judicial authority, 
proponents and opponents of judicial review before the Civil War 
 
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 
66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
101 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154–
76 (1999). 
102 See BICKEL, supra note 58, at 13–14 (noting that, to the extent jurisdiction is 
legislatively conferred, Congress may abolish judicial review by withdrawing jurisdiction). 
103 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: 
The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 405–14 (1998). 
104 See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1142–44 (2001). 
105 6 REG. DEB. 88 (1830). 
106 John C. Calhoun, Fort Hill Address, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 59, 71 
(Richard K. Crallé ed., 1864), reprinted in THE NULLIFICATION ERA: A DOCUMENTARY 
RECORD 140, 145 (William W. Freehling ed., 1967). 
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concentrated their political energies debating the merits of 
maintaining, repealing, or modifying the Judiciary Act of 1789.  
Given that almost every controversial exercise of federal judicial 
power in antebellum America was an exercise of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, the judicial power to declare laws 
unconstitutional could be substantially eviscerated or extended by 
limiting or increasing this jurisdiction.  During the 1820s, proponents 
of judicial power sought to expand the federal question jurisdiction of 
federal courts.107  Opponents sought to repeal section 25.108  When 
Joseph Story expressed fears for the survival of judicial power in 
Jacksonian America, the immediate object of his fear was the growing 
assault on section 25, not a worry that the Supreme Court would soon 
be staffed with Justices who would overrule Marbury v. Madison.109 
II 
JUDICIAL POLITICS IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 
Neither Marbury nor section 25 was in serious jeopardy of being 
overruled or repealed during the Madison, Monroe, and Adams 
administrations.  Thomas Jefferson wrote bitter letters complaining 
about the federal judiciary, but only after he left the presidency and 
his influence on national politics—as opposed to politics in 
Virginia—had waned considerably.  State legislators passed 
resolutions condemning judicial power, and state representatives 
proposed curbs on federal judicial authority when their state became 
embroiled in constitutional controversies with the federal judiciary.  
Congress brushed aside such proposals without serious legislative 
debate.  Many court-curbing measures were sharply condemned by 
both state legislatures and representatives from states whose cherished 
policies were not in immediate danger of being declared 
unconstitutional by federal judges.  When local interests were too 
powerful, either federal judges refrained from striking down state 
measures or exercises of federal judicial power striking down these 
measures were not enforced.  This combination of political support, 
judicial restraint, and local noncompliance eased pressures to weaken 
 
107 See Charles Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Supreme Court of the 
United States—A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act (pt. 1), 47 AM. 
L. REV. 1, 28 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks (pt. 1)]. 
108 See id. at 27–28; see also infra notes 179, 196 and accompanying text. 
109 See Letter from Joseph Story to Professor Ticknor (Jan. 22, 1831), in 2 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 48, 48–49 (William W. Story ed., 1851). 
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the constitutional or statutory foundations of judicial authority during 
the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
Judicial power in Jeffersonian America seemed to rest on 
politically weak foundations, even after Jefferson left the presidency.  
Jefferson remained a revered political figure in retirement.  He 
frequently urged his supporters to challenge the pretensions of the 
Marshall Court.  “[A]fter twenty years’ confirmation of the federated 
system by the voice of the nation, declared through the medium of 
elections,” the sage of Monticello bemoaned in 1819, “the judiciary 
on every occasion [is] still driving us into consolidation.”110  Hardly a 
year passed without some state government or prominent state official 
calling for the repeal of section 25 or for a constitutional amendment 
curbing federal judicial authority.  Pennsylvania in 1809,111 Ohio in 
1821,112 Virginia in 1821113 and 1829,114 Kentucky in 1823115 and 
 
110 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 212 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903); see also 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Bowdoin (Apr. 2, 1807), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 183, 186 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Caesar A. Rodney (Sept. 25, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 424, 424 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
Albert Gallatin (Sept. 27, 1810), in 12 WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra, at 427, 427; Letter 
from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (Aug. 2, 1823), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 299, 299–300 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905); Letter from Thomas Jefferson 
to James Madison (Oct. 15, 1810), in 3 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776–1826, at 
1646, 1646–47 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert 
J. Garnett (Feb. 14, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 14–16 
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903);  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith 
(Aug. 2, 1823), in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra, at 300, 301; Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (Mar. 4, 1823), in 12 WORKS OF JEFFERSON, supra, at 
277, 279; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Dearborn (Oct. 31, 1822), in 12 WORKS 
OF JEFFERSON, supra, at 264, 264–65.  Other Old Republicans voiced similar concerns.  
See Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays, RICH. ENQUIRER (June 11–22, 1819), reprinted in 
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 151 (Gerald Gunther ed., 
1969); Somers, Examination of the Opinion of the Supreme Court in the Case of Cohens 
vs. The State of Virginia, RICH. ENQUIRER, May 15, 1821. 
111 Resolution of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, April 3, 1809, in STATE DOCUMENTS 
ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 46, 46–48 (Herman V. 
Ames ed., 1906) [hereinafter STATE DOCUMENTS]. 
112 Extracts from the Report and Resolutions of Ohio Relative to the Bank and the 
Powers of the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 3, 1821), in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 
93, 93–101. 
113 Virginia on Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (Feb. 19, 1821), in STATE 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 103, 103. 
114 Resolutions of Virginia (Feb. 24, 1829), in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 
156, 156–57. 
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1824,116 Georgia in 1827,117 and South Carolina in 1827118 directly 
challenged federal judicial power to strike down their respective laws 
and policies.  Both the threat and practice of federal judicial authority 
brought forth strong state protest.  Shortly before the U.S. Supreme 
Court handed down Cohens v. Virginia, the Virginia state legislature 
passed a resolution rejecting federal authority to review state court 
decisions.119  Representative Richard Johnson of Kentucky responded 
to Green v. Biddle by proposing a constitutional amendment limiting 
federal appellate jurisdiction.120  Many prominent representatives 
made long speeches in Congress condemning the Marshall Court.  
Senator Martin Van Buren of New York, in one of the more 
restrained polemics against judicial power, suggested that “the people 
of the States might with safety be left to their own legislatures and the 
protection of their own courts.”121 
These complaints against federal judicial authority, however 
frequent, caustic, and uncompromising, did not represent mainstream 
National Republican sentiment, particularly during the “golden era of 
the Marshall Court” from 1810 to 1824.  President James Madison 
pointedly ignored Jefferson’s advice when appointing the nationalist 
Joseph Story to the Supreme Court.122  The main journalistic organ of 
the Madison administration described the Supreme Court as “a branch 
of the government which it is important to hold in due veneration.”123  
Some state legislatures responded to attacks on section 25 by passing 
resolutions supporting federal appellate jurisdiction.  When 
 
115 Extract from Preamble and Resolutions of the Legislature (Dec. 29, 1823), in STATE 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 107, 107. 
116 Remonstrance of the Legislature of Kentucky (Jan. 7, 1824), in STATE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 111, at 108, 108–10. 
117 Extract from Letter of Governor Troup to the Senators and Representatives of 
Georgia in Congress of the United States (Feb. 21, 1827), in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 111, at 122, 122–23; Extract from Report of the Legislature of Georgia Commending 
the Course of Governor Troup (Dec. 24, 1827), in STATE DOCUMENTS, supra note 111, at 
123, 123–24. 
118 South Carolina and the Harrisburg Convention (Dec. 19, 1827), in STATE 
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Pennsylvania questioned judicial authority in 1809,124 the Virginia 
state legislature declared that the Supreme Court of the United States 
was “more eminently qualified . . . to decide [disputes between states 
and the national government] than any other tribunal which could be 
[created].”125  In 1822, the Massachusetts state legislature 
proclaimed, “The Supreme Court of the United States [is] the ultimate 
tribunal for the determination of all cases arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”126  State resolutions 
supporting federal courts spoke the language of judicial supremacy. 
“[I]t belongs to the judicial department to determine all cases arising 
from a conflict between the laws of the United States and the laws of 
a particular State,” the state legislature of Massachusetts asserted.127  
State legislators added, “[T]he constitutional exercise and 
preservation of the judicial power of the United States is essential to 
the safety and prosperity of the Union.”128  Many members of 
Congress rushed to the defense of the federal judiciary when 
proposals were made to restrict judicial review.  “We say that the 
Supreme Court is like unto a majestic tree,” Representative Clement 
Dorsey of Maryland proclaimed in 1826, “shooting its roots through, 
and deriving its sustenance from, all the surrounding soil, by which it 
has attained full vigor; putting forth its foliage and branches, under 
which the American People repose with confidence and safety.”129  
Congressman Willie P. Magnum of North Carolina less 
metaphorically praised the “profound learning,” “pure intellect,” and 
“incorruptible integrity” of the Justices in a speech that insisted the 
Supreme Court was the “last hope of this country.”130 
Early nineteenth-century Supreme Court practice eased initial fears 
that unelected Justices would unduly interfere with national 
majorities.  The Marshall Court made no effort to beat down and 
erase the works of republicanism.  With the exception of Justice John 
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Marshall’s ruling during the Burr trial,131 from 1800 until 1828 the 
Supreme Court did not challenge any national initiative.  Federalist 
Justices were constitutionally powerless to interfere with Jeffersonian 
policies aimed at retrenchment.  “Judicial review,” Whittington 
observes, “is more useful for hampering the expansion of government 
than for hampering the reduction of government, regardless of any 
policy disagreements between the Court and the elected branches.”132  
Jefferson opposed constitutionally controversial exercises of national 
power, such as incorporating a national bank and federal restrictions 
on seditious speech.  Federalists, who thought these programs 
constitutionally permissible, did not insist they were also 
constitutionally necessary.  When Jefferson allowed the Sedition Act 
to expire and his successors initially refused to recharter the national 
bank, not even the most committed Hamiltonian thought the Supreme 
Court could reinstitute Federalist policies.  The Marshall Court could 
pointedly inform James Monroe that the decision in McCulloch v. 
Maryland committed the Justices to sustaining all federally funded 
internal improvements.133  No judicial remedy existed when Monroe 
vetoed the Bonus Bill on constitutional grounds.134 
Federal Justices mitigated potential tensions with Jeffersonian 
officials by pulling punches when political antagonisms were 
perceived as too intense.  The Marshall Court did not declare the 
Repeal Act of 1802 unconstitutional135 or order Thomas Jefferson to 
deliver a judicial commission to William Marbury,136 even though 
most Federalists who were not on the Court thought both claims had 
constitutional merit.137  After consistently supporting the policies of 
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the Adams administration during the undeclared war on France,138 the 
Supreme Court made decisions more consistent with the Republican 
Party after Jefferson took office.139  Federalists in the Massachusetts 
state legislature declared Jefferson’s embargo unconstitutional,140 but 
the Federalist judicial appointee serving in Massachusetts sustained 
the measure.141  On dubious legal grounds, the Marshall Court 
sustained a Virginia law outlawing the national lottery,142 even 
though the state measure was arguably identical, in all relevant 
respects, to the Maryland statute declared unconstitutional in 
McCulloch.143  John Marshall, while riding circuit in Virginia, found 
legal excuses to avoid declaring a Virginia law prohibiting free sailors 
of color from entering the state unconstitutional.  “[A]s I am not fond 
of butting against a wall in sport,” he informed Joseph Story, “I 
escaped on the construction of the act.”144 
The limited pressures to restrict judicial power during the early 
Republic were also alleviated by officials’ tendencies to ignore 
federal court rulings that “gored too many local oxen.”  Leslie 
Goldstein found “a steady stream of intermittent but fierce resistance 
from states in all parts of the country” to federal judicial authority.145  
The claimants in Fletcher v. Peck were not immediately compensated 
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after their judicial victory.  The dispossessed land speculators only 
received some redress by federal legislation that provided sums far 
less than the full value of the disputed property in 1815.146  Green v. 
Biddle had almost no influence on Kentucky land policies.147  South 
Carolina continued banning free sailors of color despite a contrary 
federal court ruling.148  Left free to maintain policies struck down by 
federal courts, local politicians did not actively pursue demands that 
federal judicial authority be curbed.  Ruth Wedgwood observes that 
“attacks [by Kentucky] upon the Supreme Court in the 1820s never 
led to any radical restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction, in part 
because the Court acquiesced in the parties’ disobedience.”149 
National political figures rarely made efforts to enforce Supreme 
Court decisions in the face of local hostility.  The Monroe and Adams 
administrations displayed no more enthusiasm for enforcing the rights 
of free sailors of color in the South than the Marshall Court did.  
Attorney General William Wirt issued an opinion declaring state 
prohibitions unconstitutional,150 but no effort was made to implement 
that decree.151  Land claimants in Kentucky received no federal 
legislative or executive assistance in obtaining actual possession of 
their judicially granted property rights.  Early nineteenth-century state 
officials, with federal acquiescence, failed to comply with federal 
court orders so frequently that some recalcitrant states questioned 
whether any obligation existed to implement federal judicial 
decisions.  Ohio legislators, committed to taxing the national bank 
after McCulloch, asked how, in light of the general disrespect for 
judicial rulings at the time, their state could “be condemned because 
she did not abandon her solemn legislative acts as a dead letter upon 
the promulgation of an opinion of that tribunal[?]”152 
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The most important Supreme Court decisions handed down during 
the “Golden Age” of the Marshall Court sustained policies preferred 
by the dominant National Republican coalition, in spite of opposition 
confined to particular localities.153  McCulloch v. Maryland held that 
both Congress and President Madison acted constitutionally when 
incorporating a national bank in the wake of the War of 1812.  While 
McCulloch was pending, large congressional majorities rejected an 
effort to repeal the national bank.  The official newspaper of the 
Monroe administration immediately endorsed the Marshall Court’s 
decision.154  Fletcher v. Peck held that prominent New England 
members of the Jeffersonian coalition could not be divested of their 
property rights when the Yazoo scandal broke in Georgia.  Marshall’s 
decision, Peter Magrath notes, “was in nearly perfect harmony with 
the attitudes and values of most politically conscious Americans.”155  
Hardly any prominent politician inside or outside of New York 
favored the Livingston monopoly that was declared unconstitutional 
in Gibbons v. Ogden.156  The Court in Green v. Biddle took the side 
of Virginia, the more powerful state, in a series of land disputes with 
Kentucky.157 
Not surprisingly, given the trend of its decisions, the Marshall 
Court enjoyed warm relations with leading National Republican 
elected officials and opinion-makers.  James Madison defended 
judicial power.158  James Monroe and John Marshall enjoyed a 
lifelong friendship.159  John Quincy Adams regarded Marshall’s 
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appointment as his father’s greatest gift to the country.160  Prominent 
National Republicans sought to exploit the close ideological affinities 
between both judicial and elected majorities by proposing measures 
that would expand the federal court system.161  Judicial power was 
more often celebrated than condemned during the ensuing debates 
over these measures.  In 1826, Daniel Webster asserted that the 
federal judiciary “has been found to fulfil [sic], so far, so well, and for 
so long a time, the great purposes which it was designed to 
accomplish.”162  Is the Supreme Court “not adorned by great and 
illustrious merit?”  Charles Mercer of Virginia inquired.163  “Are not 
all its decisions stamped with the most undeviating rectitude?”164  
The Daily National Intelligencer, a National Republican organ, 
declared that “[i]n our whole political system, there is nothing more 
valuable than the Judiciary, by the aid of which, whilst the powers of 
the Government are asserted, the rights of the several States, as well 
as of individuals, are upheld and maintained.”165  “[T]he Judiciary 
Act,” the editors continued, “is almost as sacred as the Constitution 
itself, and should be approached with nearly the same reverence.”166 
This broad support from the elite for federal judicial authority 
suggests the “Revolution of 1800” existed primarily in Jefferson’s 
mind.  The better metaphor is that of Joseph Ellis’s Founding 
Brothers.167  From 1789 until 1828, the United States was governed 
largely by the persons, or the protégés of the persons, who declared 
independence, fought the American Revolution, and supported the 
Constitution of 1789.  While familial differences existed among the 
first generation, they shared certain basic commitments.  One of those 
commitments was the sort of aristocratic republic in which the federal 
judiciary was bound to play a significant role.168  As Ran Hirschl 
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suggests in reference to other countries, first-generation judicial 
review helped a somewhat weakened elite protect certain liberal 
property rights from populist legislative impulses.169  While anti-
judicial populists controlled some state legislatures—and often had 
the power to block federal legislation aimed at further empowering 
federal courts, Republican elites, before 1828, maintained sufficient 
control over the national government to guarantee that any attack on 
the Supreme Court or other federal court decision would largely be an 
effort in symbolic politics, which was more likely to win political 
support at home than actually influence judicial authority.170 
Political fragmentation contributed significantly to federal judicial 
authority.  On some matters, most notably McCulloch v. Maryland171 
and Gibbons v. Ogden,172 the Marshall Court promoted national 
policies in the hinterlands.173  On other matters, most notably 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward and Green v. Biddle, the Marshall 
Court adjudicated controversies that, for various reasons, did not 
generate strong passions outside of the states involved.  Daniel 
Webster, in Dartmouth College, famously proclaimed, “It is . . . a 
small College . . . yet there are those who love it,”174 but the number 
of politically active citizens throughout the nation interested in the 
politics of that institution was minute.175  When adjudicating such 
matters of low political salience, federal courts engage in 
constitutional policymaking that cannot neatly be encapsulated either 
as countermajoritarian or as advancing the policies preferred by clear, 
dominant majorities.176  While some states complained bitterly about 
a particular judicial decision, others were either supportive or 
indifferent.  State positions on the abstract merits of federal judicial 
authority varied with the issues that had most recently been before 
federal courts.177  Virginians opposed judicial supremacy both during 
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the debates over the Sedition Acts and while Cohens was being 
litigated.178  Conversely, representatives from Virginia both 
supported federal judicial authority during debates over the Embargo 
Act and issued no public statement on the matter when Green v. 
Biddle was litigated.179  This inconstancy was hardly conducive to the 
formation of the relatively stable coalitions necessary to curb federal 
judicial authority. 
During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the structure of 
constitutional politics enabled federal Justices to assert their particular 
constitutional visions aggressively.  When defending policies 
supported by prominent National Republicans, Marshall Court 
Justices consistently advanced constitutional claims that were bolder 
than necessary to resolve the case.  In McCulloch, most notably, 
Marshall relied heavily on notions of federal power that James 
Madison thought too “latitudinary.”180  President Monroe’s 
conception of federal commerce power was considerably narrower 
than that advanced in Gibbons v. Ogden.181  These jurisprudential 
differences, however, had limited practical consequences before 
Andrew Jackson took office.  Members of the National Republican 
coalition who questioned the logic of McCulloch and Gibbons 
nevertheless supported the results in those cases182 and, more 
significantly, remained free to act on more limited notions of national 
authority when making other constitutional decisions.183 
Political fragmentation proved a mild curse, as well as a blessing, 
to the Marshall Court and to its political supporters.  Federal courts in 
Jeffersonian America declared state laws unconstitutional without 
risking legal, political, or personal retaliation, but the diffusion of 
political power in the early United States proved an obstacle to other 
facets of judicial authority.  A federal government with a fairly weak 
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presence in the states could not enforce most federal court decisions, 
particularly when all three elected institutions of the national 
government did not agree with the constitutional claims underlying 
the decision.184  Divided government also inhibited efforts to expand 
federal judicial authority during the 1820s.  General agreement 
existed that this judicial system should be extended to new Western 
states.  Nevertheless, judicial authority remained stagnant as the 
House and Senate could not agree on a common proposal.  National 
Republicans from different regions disputed how federal judicial 
circuits should be allocated between the states, and the ranks of those 
who disputed any particular allocation would be joined by Old 
Republicans who opposed any augmentation of federal power in any 
sense.185 
III 
THE JACKSONIAN CHALLENGE AND THE BUCHANAN RESPONSE 
More serious threats to the political foundations of federal judicial 
authority emerged after the presidential election of 1828.  Most 
scholars regard the incoming Jacksonian coalition as hostile to 
judicial power, particularly as wielded by the Marshall Court.  
Richard Longaker observes, “Respect for the Marshall court was not a 
part of the Jacksonian creed.”186  “The Jacksonians,” he states, “were 
vigorous critics of the federal judiciary, and Jackson’s election in 
1828 was in part a popular repudiation of the institutional 
aggrandizement of the judicial branch.”187  Opponents of the federal 
judiciary, long on the periphery of National Republican politics, 
became important members of the dominant national coalition.  Amos 
Kendall, who played a leading role in anti-Court fights in Kentucky, 
was a prominent member of Jackson’s inner circle.188  The Southern 
bent of the Jacksonian coalition empowered those slave states that, for 
the past fifteen years, were the center of anti-federal court sentiment.  
Some commentators hailed Jackson’s election as beginning the 
process that would bring about the repeal of section 25.  “If . . . Gen. 
 
184 See supra notes 145–52 and accompanying text. 
185 Nettels, supra note 161, at 221–24. 
186 Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 341 
(1956). 
187 Id. 
188 See Theodore W. Ruger, “A Question Which Convulses a Nation”: The Early 
Republic’s Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826, 
886–87 (2004). 
 2009] James Buchanan as Savior? 127 
Jackson . . . shall be elected,” “An Independent Kentuckian” 
predicted, “[t]hen the Judiciary Act of Congress, of 1789, shall be 
repealed.”189 
Several events augured the possible fall of the federal judiciary.  
Georgia executed George Tassels for murder, even though he had 
obtained a writ of error from the Supreme Court, which would have 
allowed him to obtain a ruling on the constitutionality of his state 
trial.190  Lest those actions be subject to misinterpretation, the 
Georgia state legislature passed resolutions declaring that the 
Supreme Court had no authority to declare state laws 
unconstitutional.191  President Jackson seemingly sided with Georgia 
when the Supreme Court, in Worcester v. Georgia,192 rejected state 
efforts to exercise jurisdiction over Native American soil.  Jackson 
may never have said, “John Marshall has made his decision, now let 
him enforce it,” but he made no effort to implement the federal 
judicial decree.193  For the first time since the Repeal Act of 1802, the 
House of Representatives seriously considered a bill that would 
weaken the federal judicial authority to declare laws unconstitutional 
in 1829.  In 1831, the House Judiciary Committee called on the 
national legislature to repeal section 25 of the Judiciary Act.  The 
majority report, written by Representative Warren Davis of South 
Carolina, declared that congressional “investigation has resulted in a 
solemn conviction that the twenty-fifth section . . . is 
unconstitutional.”194  John Marshall regarded these events as the first 
shots in the battle that would eventually destroy the authority of 
federal courts.195  “The crises of our [C]onstitution is now upon us,” 
he informed Joseph Story.196  “A strong disposition to prostrate the 
judiciary has shown itself,” he continued, “and has succeeded to a 
considerable extent.”197 
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Justice Marshall’s forebodings are better explained by the 
pessimism of old age 198 than actual political events.  The federal 
judiciary easily weathered the storms of Jackson’s first term.  
Pressured by the Jackson administration, Georgia settled the most 
important case concerning the rights of persons on Cherokee lands.199  
Attacks on federal jurisdiction were parried by overwhelming pro-
court majorities in Congress.  The House report urging the repeal of 
section 25 was resoundingly rejected, without debate, by a vote of 
138–51.200  James Buchanan’s Counter Report defending federal 
judicial power is regarded as one of the most influential documents in 
American history.201 
A.  Weak Attacks, Strong Responses 
Seen in historical context, Georgia’s defiance of federal judicial 
power did not represent a new threat to the Court’s authority.  From 
1789 until 1828, states routinely defied federal judicial orders.202  
While President Jackson almost certainly disagreed with the Marshall 
Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia, his unwillingness to 
aggressively implement that judicial decision was similar to National 
Republican unwillingness to either implement Green v. Biddle and 
Fletcher v. Peck or challenge slave state bans on free sailors of 
color.203  The national inability to enforce judicial decisions, before 
the Civil War, is better explained by the relatively weak American 
national state than by any hostility to judicial power.  Jackson thought 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Worcester was unenforceable, with 
or without federal executive support.  “[I]f orders were issued 
tomorrow one regiment of militia could not be got to march to save 
them from destruction,” he informed a correspondent, “and if a 
colision [sic] was to take place between them and the Georgians, the 
arm of the government is not sufficiently strong to preserve them 
from destruction.”204  Jackson’s passivity during the Cherokee crisis 
may also have been part of an effort to preserve judicial power for the 
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conflict over nullification looming with South Carolina—a conflict 
during which Jackson would call on the national judiciary for 
support.205  Aware that the national government had a stake in both 
appeasing Georgia and maintaining the authority of federal courts, 
Jackson pushed Georgians to settle the dispute over Cherokee lands, 
so as to leave federal judicial authority unchallenged during the 
impending nullification debates with South Carolina.206 
The proposal to repeal section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was 
strictly a southern Jacksonian measure, influenced by the Supreme 
Court’s confrontation with Georgia, the looming confrontation with 
South Carolina, the increased sectionalism of American politics, and 
the machinations of a Speaker of the House who had long been a foe 
of the Marshall Court.  By the time Jackson assumed the presidency, 
attacks on federal judicial power from free states had largely ceased.  
Virtually all proposals to narrow federal jurisdiction were made by 
representatives from those slave states that either had recently 
suffered defeats in the Supreme Court, anticipated suffering defeats in 
the very near future, or feared that Marshall Court decisions could be 
used to emancipate slaves.207  Jackson’s victory brought these 
Southerners into the dominant national coalition.  Andrew 
Stephenson, a southern Jacksonian from Virginia, was elected 
Speaker of the House.  Stephenson, who had proposed curbing federal 
judicial power during the 1820s,208 packed the House Judiciary 
Committee with representatives from those slave states that were 
most hostile to the existing federal court system.209  More than fifty-
five percent of House members at that time represented free states, 
but five of the seven representatives appointed to the Judiciary 
Committee hailed from the south.210  Four of the members—Warren 
R. Davis of South Carolina, Thomas F. Foster of Georgia, William F. 
Gordon of Virginia, and Henry Daniel of Kentucky—represented the 
only four states experiencing conflict with federal courts.211  Those 
four members endorsed the majority report calling for the repeal of 
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section 25.212  The other three members—James Buchanan of 
Pennsylvania, William W. Ellsworth of New York, and Edward D. 
White of Louisiana—signed the Counter Report.213  No 
representative from New England, where support for judicial power in 
1830 was the strongest,214 served on the House Judiciary Committee 
when repeal of section 25 was considered. 
The overwhelming 138–51 congressional vote against the majority 
report demonstrated that opposition to federal judiciary authority was 
largely confined to South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, and 
Kentucky.215  Representatives from those four states provided almost 
two-thirds of the support for the committee recommendation, voting 
33–12 for repeal.  No other state with more than three representatives 
endorsed the majority report.216  The other large, slave state 
congressional delegations—North Carolina, Tennessee, and 
Maryland—voted 6–4, 4–3, and 8–0, respectively, against repeal.217  
Representatives from northern states almost unanimously rejected the 
committee report.  Only six free-state representatives favored 
repealing section 25.  Rejection was bipartisan.  All sixty-seven 
National Republicans in Congress, including all sixteen National 
Republicans from slave states, voted against repeal.218  They were 
joined by sixty-nine of the 120 Jacksonians in Congress.  Northern 
Jacksonians voted 51–6 against repeal. 
American newspapers expressed no more enthusiasm for repeal 
than American legislators.  The journalistic commentary on the repeal 
of section 25 was overwhelmingly negative.  Seventeen newspapers, 
representing all sections of the United States, printed commentaries 
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opposing the majority report.219  Only four newspapers supported 
repeal.220 
Anti-repeal articles effusively praised federal judicial power.  The 
language of many commentators resolutely suggested a commitment 
to strong forms of judicial supremacy—the judicial power to 
authoritatively interpret constitutional provisions.  “Repeal the vital 
part of the Judiciary Act,” the Daily National Intelligencer 
proclaimed, “and we would not give a fig for the Constitution.”221  
That journal made clear that maintaining federal judicial supremacy 
was vital because the Supreme Court was “the only effective barrier 
between liberty and tyranny under our Government.”222  The New 
York Spectator described the proposed repeal as “fraught with the 
most imminent peril to the existence of this union.”223 
The congressional vote and public response to the House Judiciary 
Committee’s proposed repeal of section 25 suggests that threats to 
federal judicial authority did not dramatically increase in the wake of 
the 1828 national election.  Supreme Court decisions were not 
enforced in states where significant opposition existed.  That, 
however, was as true before, as it was after, Jackson assumed the 
presidency.224  The only immediate major consequence of the 
Jacksonian Revolution was that representatives opposed to federal 
judicial power became part, but only part, of the dominant national 
coalition for the first time since 1808.  One privilege of membership 
in this coalition proved to be the capacity to pack the House Judiciary 
Committee.  Nevertheless, while Andrew Stephenson and his 
ideological allies could produce a committee report denouncing 
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judicial review in 1831, they could not even convince a majority of 
Jacksonian representatives to support their recommendations.  The 
vote on repeal, as well as the public commentary, indicates that the 
constitutional politics of federal jurisdiction was not seriously altered 
during the initial transition to Jacksonian rule.  Opponents of federal 
judicial power continued to be limited to representatives from states 
that had recently suffered judicial defeat or expected to suffer defeat 
in the very near future.225  The rest of the country, or at least the rest 
of the country interested in federal judicial power, continued 
regarding the federal judiciary as “the most sacred department of this 
[g]overnment.”226 
B.  Explaining Judicial Support in 1831 
James Buchanan did not bear an onerous burden of persuasion 
when defending the existing structure of judicial authority.  Important 
differences between the majority and minority reports suggest that all 
members of the House Judiciary Committee were aware that strong, 
durable legislative majorities supported the judiciary’s authority to 
declare federal and state laws unconstitutional in 1831.  Most national 
representatives favored a strong federal judiciary, crucial passages in 
Buchanan’s Counter Report suggested, because the federal judiciary 
could be counted on to defend such national policies as protective 
tariffs, the national bank, and federal land ownership in the small 
number of states where these popular measures were under 
constitutional attack.227  Davis’s majority report, by comparison, did 
not link the repeal of section 25 to the maintenance of any popular 
national program.228  Southern anti-court activists appealed to 
northern Jacksonians on the basis of constitutional principles devoid 
of self-interest, rarely a winning political strategy. 
Much of Davis’s majority and Buchanan’s minority reports was 
devoted to questions of constitutional interpretation and general 
principles of American constitutionalism.  Both relied heavily on the 
stock arguments for and against federal judicial oversight that 
Americans had been developing since the Constitution was ratified.  
Davis emphasized the importance of state sovereignty.229  Buchanan 
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highlighted the importance of uniformity.230  Both cited the 
traditional authorities for their interpretation of federal judicial power.  
The majority report included long passages both from resolutions 
issued by Virginia and Kentucky and from several state court 
opinions declaring section 25 unconstitutional.231  The Counter 
Report cited the Supreme Court’s opinions in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee and Cohens v. Virginia, while also citing the Federalist 
Papers.232 
Proponents and opponents of section 25 insisted that the 
constitutional text sanctioned their interpretation of federal judicial 
power.  The Davis report asserted that the language of Article III 
limited the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to cases 
decided by the lower federal courts.233  “Did the convention 
contemplate, in using the term appellate jurisdiction, the right and 
power of taking an appeal from a State court to the Supreme Court?” 
Davis asked.234  He concluded that: 
The answer to these questions must be found in the [C]onstitution.     
. . . In all other cases before mentioned, says the [C]onstitution, the 
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.  What courts have 
the original jurisdiction in all those cases before mentioned in the 
second section of the third article . . . . Let the [C]onstitution 
answer: in “such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to 
time, ordain and establish.”  Is a State court an inferior court?  The 
[C]onstitution does not say so.  If the framers of the [C]onstitution 
had so considered them, and had intended the right and power of 
taking an appeal from their judgments to the Supreme Court, it was 
an easy matter, and they, doubtless would have said so: their 
omitting to do so, is proof irresistible that the power was not 
intended to be given.  It is unreasonable to believe that they who 
were so very precise and specific in the enumeration of cases and 
powers of infinitely less moment, would have left to implication 
and inference, a power that breaks down all the barriers between the 
State and Federal Governments.235 
Buchanan maintained that the text of Article III clearly contemplated 
that the Supreme Court would review state court decisions.  He 
argued: 
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On the supposition contended for, it is wholly unaccountable that 
the framers of the [C]onstitution did not limit the natural effect of 
the words used in the first clause, by making the second to read 
“that, in all the other cases before mentioned,” arising in the inferior 
courts of the United States, “the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction.”236 
The majority and minority reports advanced conflicting notions of 
federal-state relationships under the Constitution.  Champions of 
repeal insisted that section 25 subverted constitutional federalism.  
Davis complained that the constitutional justifications for federal 
appellate review empowered the Supreme Court “to prohibit State 
legislation by writs of injunction[,] to sequestrate State treasuries[,] . . 
. to imprison State functionaries, whether governors, judges, or State 
Legislatures, in a body,” and, more generally, “to blot out from the 
map any State of the Union.”237  Proponents of section 25 contended 
that national union depended on federal review of state court 
decisions.  As Buchanan asserted: 
[R]epeal would seriously endanger the existence of this Union. . . .  
If this section were repealed, the General Government would be 
deprived of the power, by means of its own judiciary, to give effect 
either to the [C]onstitution which called it into existence, or to the 
laws and treaties made under its authority.  It would be compelled 
to submit, in many important cases, to the decisions of State courts; 
and thus the very evil which the present [C]onstitution was intended 
to prevent would be entailed upon the people.  The judiciary of the 
States might refuse to carry into effect the laws of the United States; 
and without that appeal to the Supreme Court which the 25th 
section authorizes, these laws would thus be entirely annulled, and 
could not be executed without a resort to force.238 
The repeal of section 25, Buchanan added, would create constitutional 
confusion; every state might interpret constitutional limitations 
differently.  Buchanan declared, “Another reason for preserving this 
section is, that, without it, there would be no uniformity in the 
construction and administration of the [C]onstitution, laws, and 
treaties of the United States.”239 
The dispute between the majority and minority reports was limited 
to vertical judicial review, the power of federal courts to declare state 
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laws unconstitutional.  The Southerners on the House Judiciary 
Committee did not question horizontal judicial review, the federal 
judicial power to declare federal legislation unconstitutional.  The 
majority report took no position on the issues raised by the last 
paragraphs of Marbury v. Madison.  Davis declared: 
 However, therefore, it may be admitted or denied, that the 
judicial department of the Federal Government is, in all questions 
submitted to it by the forms of the [C]onstitution, to decide in the 
last resort in relation to the authorities of the other departments of 
that Government, it can never be authorized so to decide in relation 
to the right of the parties to the constitutional compact, from which 
the judicial, as well as the other departments, hold their delegated 
trusts.240 
Most, but not all, Southerners accepted the granting of state judicial 
power to declare state laws unconstitutional.  Judicial review was 
established in Virginia and South Carolina before Marbury was 
decided.241  Georgia courts had asserted the power to declare state 
laws unconstitutional without actually striking a state measure 
down.242  Kentucky was the only southern state represented on the 
House Judiciary Committee in which state judicial power was 
actively contested while Jackson was president.243 
Proponents of repeal who accepted coordinate judicial review were 
far more concerned with limiting the authority of the federal 
government than the authority of federal courts.  Section 25 was the 
objectionable means by which federal officials in all branches of the 
national government restricted state authority to determine 
constitutional meanings.  Davis’s majority report “denied that the 
judicial department of the Federal Government, or all the departments 
of that Government conjointly, were empowered to decide finally and 
authoritatively, in questions of sovereignty, controversies between a 
State and the Federal Government.”244  Such a power was inconsistent 
with the southern compact theory.  As Davis asserted, “[T]here was 
no common tribunal established by the [C]onstitution for such a 
purpose, and that consequently, each party had the right to judge of 
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and determine the extent of its own rights and powers.”245  In his 
view, state sovereignty was violated whenever any national official 
challenged state constitutional decisions.  “It is no more necessary to 
the harmonious action of the Federal and State Governments, that the 
federal courts should have power to control decisions of State courts 
by appeal,” the majority report contended, “than that the Federal 
Legislature should have power to control the legislation of the States, 
or the Federal Executive a State Executive, by a negative.”246  The 
problem with section 25, from the perspective of anti-court 
Jacksonians, was that no agency of the federal government had the 
power to declare state laws unconstitutional. 
The majority report made no effort to unite political interest with 
constitutional principle.  The Davis report did not complain of any 
particular state policy that federal courts had declared unconstitutional 
or offer a realistic hypothetical instance of a federal judicial decision 
that might be ruinous to states.  Representatives, Davis insisted, 
should be guided solely by constitutional concerns, while discounting 
mere matters of political gain.  “The committee,” the majority report 
stated, “believe [sic] that it is the imperative duty of Congress to 
repeal, without delay, any of its acts in contravention of the 
[C]onstitution, be the consequences what they may.”247  Davis 
insisted at great length that arming federal courts with the power to 
declare local laws unconstitutional gave the “Supreme Court a 
supervisory and controlling power over twenty-four sovereign 
States.”248  He did not explain why this “controlling power” was 
undesirable, particularly when federal courts were demanding that a 
few states respect policies that most national representatives thought 
to be in the national interest.  The House Judiciary Committee made 
only a feeble effort to address Buchanan’s claim that federal courts 
guaranteed legal uniformity.  The majority merely cited Judge 
Spencer Roane’s assertion in Hunter v. Martin that “it is no cause of 
offence [sic] to foreign nations, to have their causes decided, and 
exclusively and finally decided by the State tribunals.”249  Neither 
Roane nor Davis discussed specific instances when foreign nations 
peacefully acquiesced in state court decisions that offered diverse 
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interpretations of federal treaties.  Uniformity should not be 
considered a problem in practice, their arguments implied, because 
uniformity was not a problem in theory.250 
The Counter Report made a greater effort to unite constitutional 
principle with practical advantage.  Buchanan offered three thinly 
disguised hypothetical illustrations of how local majorities could 
thwart popular national policies if section 25 was repealed.  The first 
considered tariff policy in the absence of federal judicial oversight.  
Buchanan asserted: 
Suppose the Legislature of one of the States, believing the tariff 
laws to be unconstitutional, should determine that they ought not to 
be executed within its limits.  They accordingly pass a law, 
imposing the severest penalties upon the collector and other 
custom-house officers of the United States within their territory, if 
they should collect the duties on the importation of foreign 
merchandise.  The collector proceeds to discharge the duties of his 
office under the laws of the United States, and he is condemned and 
punished before a State court for violating this State law.  Repeal 
this section, and the decision of the State court would be final and 
conclusive; and any State could thus nullify any act of Congress 
which she deemed to be unconstitutional.251 
This example was followed by similar hypotheticals analyzing how 
repeal would influence national land and banking policies.  Buchanan 
asked his fellow representatives to consider the consequences should 
either a governor declare “that the land belonging to the United States 
within her territory is now the property of the State, by virtue of her 
sovereign authority”252 or a state legislature declare the national bank 
“a nuisance, and inflict penalties upon all its officers for making 
discounts or receiving deposites [sic].”253  Although each example 
was phrased as a hypothetical, all had recently taken place.  Several 
state legislatures had passed resolutions declaring protective tariffs 
unconstitutional.  The South Carolina legislature had challenged the 
constitutionality of the tariff in 1828254 and would soon assert that 
federal revenue laws were “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon 
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this State, its officers or citizens.”255  Indiana and Mississippi had 
asserted that the federal government had no power to own lands 
within the state.256  Illinois was debating a similar resolution.  In 
1821, the Ohio legislature challenged the power of the Supreme Court 
to decide McCulloch v. Maryland.257  Other states were considering 
anti-bank resolutions.258  None of these resolutions had broad popular 
support when repeal was being debated.  In 1831, Buchanan and 
strong congressional majorities favored protective tariffs,259 federal 
land ownership,260 and the national bank.261  Federal judicial 
authority, in these circumstances, was a vital means for enforcing 
these popular policies. 
The tariff was a particular concern for Buchanan and his 
constituents.  When Buchanan served in the House of Representatives 
from 1821 to 1831, he made numerous speeches championing 
protective tariffs and defending the constitutionality of that policy.  In 
1823, Buchanan declared protective tariffs “of great importance to the 
best interests of this country.”262  During the debate over the “Tariff 
of Abominations,” he stated that the constitutionality of protective 
tariffs had “long since been settled.”263  He continued with the 
following: 
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[T]he best interests of our country demand that every possible 
exertion should be made to procure the passage of an act of 
Congress imposing such duties as will enable our manufacturers to 
enter into fair competition with foreign manufacturers, and protect 
the farmer, the growers of hemp and wool, and the distiller of spirits 
from domestic materials, against foreign competition.264 
Representative Buchanan frequently declared himself a friend of 
the American system and “heartily approve[d]” of tariffs that 
protected major domestic concerns.265  His constituents in 
Pennsylvania were even more enthusiastic about protective tariffs.  
When Buchanan voted against the 1827 tariff as excessive, the 
resulting political storm convinced him to support even higher duties 
the next year.266 
Most national representatives from states, other than Virginia and 
the lower South, shared Buchanan’s position on protective tariffs.  
Protection was even popular in early Jacksonian strongholds.  When 
southern states attacked the constitutionality of the tariff in the mid-
1820s, state legislatures in Ohio, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Indiana, and New York responded with resolutions affirming 
the constitutionality of that national policy.267  During Jackson’s first 
term, Kentucky, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, 
and Vermont passed resolutions supporting protective tariffs.268  State 
legislators in Pennsylvania resolved that “the Constitution of the 
United States, authorises [sic] acts of Congress to protect 
manufactures, and that the actual prosperity of the country attests the 
wisdom of such acts.”269  The Louisiana state legislature simply 
stated that “the Tariff [was] constitutional, expedient, and harmless to 
the southern states.”270  In Ohio and Pennsylvania, public sentiment 
favoring the tariff may have played particularly crucial roles in the 
vote against repeal.  In the early 1820s, Ohio had vigorously opposed 
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judicial power, and Pennsylvania had the highest percentage of 
Jacksonian representatives among northern states.  Nevertheless, all 
thirty-five representatives from these two states supported section 25 
in 1831. 
In 1831, Buchanan believed the federal government was 
constitutionally authorized to incorporate a national bank and that 
incorporation was wise public policy.  While a member of the 
Federalist Party in 1815, Buchanan condemned Republicans for 
“refusing the Bank of the United States a continuation of their 
charter.”271  That Jeffersonian policy “embarrassed the financial 
concerns of the government, and withdr[ew] the only universal paper 
medium of the country from circulation.”272  His enthusiasm for 
President Jackson in the 1820s did not immediately diminish his 
enthusiasm for the national bank.  In 1826, Buchanan spoke of “that 
firm and beautiful fabric, which the Supreme Court has already 
erected,”273 a fabric that included the judicial decision in McCulloch 
v. Maryland sustaining the constitutionality of the national bank.  In 
1832, Buchanan both rejected an invitation to become Secretary of 
the Treasury because “[h]e did not want to be the agent to destroy the 
Bank of the United States” and informed Jackson that he was 
“inclined to be friendly to the recharter of the Bank of the United 
States.”274 
Many Jacksonians, when repeal was being debated, had a similarly 
favorable assessment of the national bank.  By the late 1820s, Richard 
Ellis observes, the bank “had become well respected and even popular 
in some quarters.”275  One of those quarters was Jackson’s first 
cabinet, a majority of which favored the renewing of the bank’s 
corporate charter.276  During the early 1830s, Congress was another 
bastion of support for the national bank.  One year after rejecting the 
House Judiciary Committee report on repeal, majorities in both the 
House and Senate voted to extend the life of the national bank, and all 
of its privileges, for another twenty years.  Although nominal 
Jacksonian majorities existed in both branches of the national 
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government, nearly three-fifths of all representatives in both the 
House and Senate supported the national bank in 1832.277 
Representatives from the states established in 1831 almost 
unanimously opposed claims that title to unowned lands automatically 
transferred from the federal government to the states when a territory 
entered the Union.  Daniel Feller’s study of public land policy in the 
early Jacksonian period details how “Northerners and Southerners, 
Adams and Jackson men, all spurned the Western claims.”278  
Buchanan’s fellow representative from Pennsylvania, James 
Stephenson, spoke of the need to “effectually check . . . the giving 
away [of] this most invaluable national property.”279  Democrats from 
the slave states described cession as “unjust” and as evidence of “the 
grasping usurpations” of the newer states.280  Congress initially 
refused to publish state resolutions demanding cession, and then 
refused to debate the issue.281  A test proposal to cede some land in 
Tennessee was defeated by an overwhelming vote.282 
James Buchanan, his fellow northern Jacksonians, and most 
members of the House of Representatives were not forced to choose 
between their constitutional principles and the interests of their 
constituents when voting on the proposed repeal of section 25.  Most 
representatives believed that constitutional government in the United 
States depended on federal review of state court decisions.283  
Thomas H. Crawford of Pennsylvania spoke for the national majority 
when he declared, “[T]he stroke that shall cut off the 25th section of 
the judiciary act from our code, will inflict a fatal wound upon the 
character of our common rights.”284  Most legislators were also 
convinced that federal judicial review was likely to, more often than 
not, promote desired policies.  In 1831, the Marshall Court was likely 
to support popular sentiment, at least in Congress, that protective 
tariffs, the national bank, and federal land policies were 
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constitutional.285  Outside of a few southern states, hardly any 
representative or political journalist worried about a Supreme Court 
decision that would declare either policies with strong national 
support or policies cherished in the more populous, free states 
unconstitutional.286  The dearth of debate and lack of primary sources 
make impossible firm statements about whether Buchanan’s Counter 
Report merely preached to the choir, but the evidence suggests that 
persuading most representatives in 1831 that federal judicial review 
was desirable was not a Herculean accomplishment. 
C.  The Waning of the Jacksonian Anti-Court Movement 
1831 was the highwater mark for Jacksonian attacks on federal 
courts.  The following year, legislative proposals to either limit the 
scope of section 25 or abolish life tenure for federal Justices were 
easily defeated in the House of Representatives.287  Charles Warren’s 
magisterial history of section 25 notes no serious effort to reduce 
federal jurisdiction or restrict the judicial power to declare laws 
unconstitutional during President Jackson’s second term.288  Sporadic 
attacks on judicial power were renewed during the 1850s, but 
significant opposition to the crucial provisions in the Judiciary Act of 
1789 had ceased for the political season.289 
Proponents of federal judicial power during the early 1830s 
regained legislative momentum.  Congress responded to the 
nullification crisis by passing legislation endorsed by President 
Jackson that augmented federal courts’ authority.  These courts, under 
the Force Act of 1833, became the first line of defense against local 
challenges to protective tariffs.  That measure declared, “[T]he 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States shall extend to all 
cases . . . arising under the revenue laws of the United States.”290  Just 
before leaving office, Jackson signed the Judiciary Act of 1837.  This 
bill added two Associate Justices to the Supreme Court, increased the 
number of lower federal court judges, and integrated all western states 
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that had been admitted to the Union in the past decades into the 
federal circuit court system.291 
The tone of public debate reflected this renewed commitment to 
federal judicial authority.  Gone, for the most part, were Jacksonian 
speeches condemning federal court oversight of state judicial 
decisions.  Instead, a general consensus developed that federal courts 
with the power to declare state and federal laws unconstitutional were 
a blessing to American constitutionalism.  Charles Hammond, a 
leader in the anti-Court fights during the 1820s, when referring to 
constitutional limitations during the 1830s, stated, “It is only through 
the Supreme Court that this salutary restraint can be made impartially 
and effectually operative.”292  In 1835, Buchanan, then a senator, 
asserted with great confidence, “It has then been established, that our 
present Judicial system shall not be abandoned.”293 
Remarkably, Jacksonian attacks on judicial power waned as the 
coalition’s attacks on the constitutional vision championed by the 
Marshall Court decisions intensified.  Opposition to the national bank 
and protective tariffs became central planks of Jacksonian democracy 
during the 1830s.  Abandoning the “big tent” in which Jacksonians 
initially captured the presidency, the Democratic Party platform in 
1840 asserted, “[C]ongress has no power to charter a national bank,” 
and “no more revenue ought to be raised, than is required to defray 
the necessary expenses of the government.”294  For the next twenty 
years, every Jacksonian candidate for the presidency ran on a 
platform that repeated that litany.295  Jacksonians who articulated 
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contrary sentiments in 1828 either converted or became Whigs.296  
Only eastern Jacksonian opposition to cession remained constant 
during the turbulent 1830s.297 
James Buchanan moved in step with this Jacksonian tide.  During 
Jackson’s first term, he was a proponent of the Bank of the United 
States.298  By the end of Jackson’s second term, Buchanan strongly 
opposed that institution.  “It is mortifying to observe what a powerful 
influence the Bank of the U.S. exerts over the minds of those who 
consider themselves the well born & the well bred of the land,” he 
complained to Andrew Jackson.299  Repeating what had become 
orthodox Jacksonian dogma, Buchanan continued, “It is among the 
hard handed & honest farmers & mechanicks [sic] of the Count[r]y 
that the opposition to this Institution & to a monied Aristocracy 
prevails.”300  During the 1820s, Buchanan was a leading proponent of 
protective tariffs.301  He abandoned this position during the 1840s.  
When James Polk became President, Buchanan claimed to support “a 
revenue Tariff with [only] moderate discriminations for incidental 
protection.”302  In 1856, his campaign biography labored implausibly 
to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Democrat had never supported a 
protective tariff per se as a young representative, but merely thought 
that protection could be a secondary purpose of a tariff whose primary 
purpose was revenue.303 
Federal judicial power survived this regime transition both partly 
because the surviving Federalist/National Republican Justices were a 
bit more restrained during the Jackson presidency and partly because 
Joseph Story and Smith Thompson were the only Federalist/National 
Republican Justices who survived the Jackson presidency.  The 
Supreme Court was noticeably less activist between 1828 and 1836.  
Every significant opinion Justice John Marshall wrote that favored a 
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state against either a claim of individual constitutional right or 
preemption by Congress was issued after John Quincy Adams was 
voted out of office.304  Barron v. City of Baltimore held that the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution did not limit state power.305  
Providence Bank v. Billings held that courts would not imply 
immunity from taxation in state corporate charters.306  Willson v. 
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. held that the Commerce Clause does not 
forbid states from damming navigable rivers when they do so to 
promote health.307  Breaking with earlier policy, Marshall declared in 
1834 that the Justices would decide cases only when a majority of the 
entire Court supported the result and not merely a majority of the 
Justices voting.308  This novel practice, combined with judicial deaths 
and absences, prevented the Supreme Court from handing down 
decisions in several important cases concerning the constitutional 
limitations on state governments during the early 1830s.309  By the 
time that tribunal was fully staffed, the Marshall Court had become 
the Taney Court.  Jackson had the opportunity to replace Marshall and 
four of the six sitting Associate Justices.310  The Judiciary Act of 
1837 gave Martin Van Buren two additional Supreme Court 
appointments.311  The reconstituted Supreme Court immediately 
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sustained the state laws under constitutional attack in three important 
cases, New York v. Miln,312 Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge,313 and Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky,314 that had been held over 
from the Marshall years.  A dejected Joseph Story complained, 
“There will not, I fear, ever in our day, be any case in which a law of 
a State or of Congress will be declared unconstitutional; for the old 
constitutional doctrines are fast fading away.”315  Jacksonians were 
more enthusiastic.  “The late renovation of the [C]onstitution of this 
august body, by the creation of seven of the nine members under the 
auspices of the present Democratic ascendancy,” the Democratic 
Review of Washington triumphantly declared, “may be regarded as 
the closing of an old and the opening of a new era in its history.”316 
The changing composition of the federal judiciary helps explain 
why James Buchanan remained a strong supporter of federal judicial 
power during the first decade of Jacksonian rule.  As a member of the 
House of Representatives during the early 1830s, he led the fight to 
maintain section 25.  As a member of the Senate during the late 
1830s, Buchanan continued endorsing the expansion of federal 
judicial power and celebrating judicial supremacy, but with very 
different expectations about the course of that power.  Representative 
Buchanan married support for the Bank of the United States to 
support for federal judicial authority.317  Senator Buchanan combined 
support for federal judicial authority with opposition to the national 
bank.  He declared: 
In my opinion a large majority of the people of [Pennsylvania], and 
myself among the number, believe that the creation of this vast 
moneyed monopoly, with the privilege of issuing bank paper to the 
amount of thirtyfive [sic] millions of dollars, is dangerous to our 
liberties, and to our dearest interests.  We desire to try the question 
before the supreme judicial tribunal of the land, whether its charter 
is protected by the Constitution of the United States.318 
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Judicial review, which had once functioned as a means for promoting 
state conformity with national policies, was now equally valued as a 
means for sweeping away the policies of a deposed regime. 
Twenty years later, Buchanan reemphasized his commitment to 
judiciary supremacy when urging the Supreme Court to settle debates 
over the constitutional status of slavery.  Whether slaveholders could 
bring their human chattel into the territories, his inaugural address 
declared, was “a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, before whom it is now pending, 
and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.”319  This 
speech announced no new Jacksonian dogma.  While some 
Jacksonians came to approve of the courts more slowly than others, 
the Democratic coalition as a whole had always supported judicial 
authority.  Courts were sometimes useful means for imposing national 
policies on dissident localities, sometimes sites for removing the 
policy debris left by ousted administrations, and sometimes vehicles 
for diverting sectional issues from national, electoral politics.  Despite 
both changing their views on many constitutional issues and the 
changing functions of federal courts, Buchanan and most northern 
Jacksonians had been committed to federal judicial power for more 
than thirty years, in part, because the tenor of federal court decisions 
evolved largely in lockstep with Jacksonian political circumstances 
and protean constitutional visions. 
IV 
FRAGMENTATION AND JUDICIAL POWER 
Politics moves.  Political fortunes, partisan alignments, the function 
of governing institutions, the most pressing issues of the day, and the 
frames for perceiving those issues are always changing.  These 
constant developments cannot be fully captured by a legal history or a 
political science that provides only discrete descriptions of different 
institutions or snapshots of the entire political order at a particular 
time.  Momentum matters whether the human activity be sports, 
medicine, or politics.  Cancer treatments vary both with the size of the 
tumor and with whether the malignancy is growing or shrinking.  
Politics is as “constructed historically.”  Karen Orren and Stephen 
Skowronek observe, “[T]he nature and prospects of any single part 
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[of a political order is] best understood within the long course of 
political formation.”320  Presidential capacity, at any point in time, 
depends on whether a particular partisan regime is consolidating or 
disintegrating.321  Poll results that reflect no change from the status 
quo have a different meaning than the same numbers when they 
reveal a long-term trend favoring one candidate.  The choices 
reformers make are consequences of past decisions and political 
trends.  “If we could first know where we are and whither we are 
tending,” Abraham Lincoln pointed out, when explaining what could 
be done to limit the expansion of slavery, “we [might] better judge 
what to do and how to do it.”322 
The snapshots on the previous pages highlight one way 
fragmentation promotes judicial power.  Federal courts decide 
constitutional issues without fear of political retaliation as long as one 
institution, or institutional player with the power to block attacks on 
the judiciary, prefers that existing judges be vested with the 
responsibility for making particular decisions rather than the probable 
alternative.  The more institutions or institutional players with veto 
power, the greater the likely size of the jurisprudential space in which 
Justices may freely roam.  In 1827, President John Quincy Adams 
could be counted on to protect judicial authority.  In 1831, James 
Buchanan and a House majority rejected an effort to abolish the 
judicial power to declare state laws unconstitutional.  Had the House 
voted to repeal section 25 in 1833, that measure would have gone 
down in defeat in the Whig-controlled Senate.  The faces on the 
annual photograph taken of politicians favoring judicial review would 
change from 1789 to 1837, but the picture would always include a 
working majority of at least one elected branch of the national 
government. 
These stills cry out to be integrated into a motion picture providing 
a developmental account of judicial power in the United States.  
Numerous snapshots depict judicial power feeding on fragmentation, 
but the particular institutions and political factions providing the 
needed judicial nutrition change—sometimes fairly rapidly.  The 
President, House, and Senate, from 1827 until 1833, took turns being 
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the main bulwarks against attacks on the federal court system.  This 
alternation suggests the possibility that American politics develops in 
ways that render all three elected branches of the national government 
lining up against the judiciary as a highly unlikely scenario.  If this is 
so, then the main theory of political change underlying many studies 
on the political foundations of judicial authority needs revising. 
Students of American constitutional development work within 
variations of classical realignment theory when explaining historical 
support for judicial review in the United States.323  Politics, in this 
view, is an ongoing cycle of coming together and falling apart.  One 
or two critical elections bring a united, partisan coalition to power that 
shapes politics for the next thirty years or so.  During the years 
immediately following these critical elections, that coalition controls 
the national government and is fairly united on common goals.  Over 
time, politics fragments.  Coalition members begin to fight amongst 
themselves over particular policies and sometimes lose control of the 
Presidency, House, or Senate.  Soon after, another series of critical 
elections takes place that brings a new dominant political coalition to 
power. 
Judicial power, prominent works suggest, is determined by this 
political cycle.324  The size of the jurisprudential space in which 
Justices are free to roam increases as politics disintegrates, then 
sharply decreases in the wake of the political consolidations that mark 
critical elections.  Reconstruction Presidents who attain office during 
critical elections attack a federal judiciary still controlled by members 
of the electorally deposed coalition.  Once the reconstructive 
President has made the appointments necessary for a more friendly 
court system, the party in power expands federal judicial power as 
insurance against their eventual weakening.  When the weakening 
does occur, the still-dominant party looks to the courts to maintain 
policies that no longer command adequate support in the elected 
branches of the national government. 
American constitutional politics from 1820 until 1840 is consistent 
with many, but not all, aspects of this realignment synthesis.  The 
Marshall Court thrived in the early 1820s as the National Republican 
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order was disintegrating.  Jackson’s election in 1828 inaugurated a 
period of increased attacks on judicial review.  The consolidation of 
the Jacksonian regime during the late 1830s led to legislation 
expanding the federal judiciary.  Realignment theory does not, 
however, explain the enthusiasm northern Jacksonians displayed for 
federal courts in 1831.  Buchanan did not act consistently with 
contemporary understandings of the constitutional politics after 
critical elections.  Contrary to Burnham’s expectations, Buchanan did 
not attack the federal court system.325  Contrary to Lasser’s 
hypothesis, Buchanan did not urge fellow partisans in the House to 
preserve judicial power for future use.326  Contrary to Whittington’s 
contentions, Buchanan did not regard judicial supremacy as an 
unfortunate, but entrenched, feature of the constitutional order.327  
Instead, three years after the critical election of 1828 had taken place, 
Buchanan and the Jacksonian majority in Congress still seemed 
supportive of the National Republican constitutional vision being 
championed by the Marshall Court. 
David Mayhew’s criticisms of realignment theory328 and the 
concept of “intercurrence”329 provide a better theoretical framework 
for understanding Buchanan’s support for the federal judiciary and 
the similar support shown by his fellow Jacksonians in the House of 
Representatives.  Mayhew acknowledges that the shape of the 
political universe changes, but its development takes place slowly and 
incrementally.  “Big bangs,” in his view, are not the only forces that 
shape the American political universe.  “[E]lectoral politics,” 
Mayhew contends, “is to an important degree just one thing after 
another.”330  Orren and Skowronek use the expression “intercurrence” 
to describe the erratic patterns that characterize political transitions in 
the United States.331  They insist that “the normal condition of the 
polity [is] that of multiple, incongruous authorities operating 
simultaneously.”332  No single thread unites all governing 
arrangements in the United States.  Rather, they observe, “the 
institutions of a polity . . . are created . . . at different times, in the 
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light of different experiences, and often for quite contrary 
purposes.”333 
Combined, these observations suggest a regime in which powerful 
forces, such as an economic depression, a foreign policy crisis, or a 
dramatic change in the mass electorate, influence rather than 
overwhelm the distinctive developmental logics of relatively 
autonomous governing institutions.  How the separated branches of 
the national government respond to events that restructure the 
political order depends, in part, on external events and, in part, on the 
internal dynamics of those institutions.  Presidents are historically 
more sensitive to foreign affairs than the national legislature.334 
World War II fostered greater attention to racial equality, in part, 
because Americans were fighting a racist state335 and, in part, because 
the New Deal had increased the number of racial liberals in prominent 
government positions.336 
Early nineteenth-century constitutional politics provides one 
example of the complex interaction between outside phenomena and 
the distinctive features of each branch of the national government.  
All governing institutions were influenced by the rise of mass 
political parties and near-universal white male suffrage.  The relative 
democratization of American politics had an immediate and powerful 
effect on presidential elections, which depended on whether a 
coalition could turn out more voters in crucial states.  
Democratization had a later, and far more subdued, influence on the 
Senate, which was staffed by persons appointed by the state 
legislature. 
Fragmentation or intercurrence provides space for judicial power at 
particular times and serves as the primary vehicle for preserving that 
space over time.  Somewhat separated political institutions are likely 
to have somewhat different perspectives on the course of judicial 
decisions.  These differences create opportunities for relatively 
autonomous judicial policymaking.  During the 1960s, apportionment 
took place without successful partisan challenge because the 
Democratic Presidents who anticipated a more liberal Congress were 
far more sympathetic to the judicial decision in Baker v. Carr337 than 
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House members whose hold on office was rendered more 
precarious.338  Fragmented political institutions are also characterized 
by partly distinctive developmental trajectories.  The Presidency, 
Senate, and House react to the same external stimulus in different 
ways partly because of their internal logics.  Not only are these 
institutions likely to occupy somewhat different spaces in the political 
universe, they are always likely to be moving at somewhat different 
speeds in somewhat different directions.  Roe v. Wade339 remained 
good law during the 1990s because, while the House of 
Representatives and Senate became more conservative, the presidency 
was occupied by a Democrat who appointed two pro-choice Justices, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, to the Supreme Court. 
While periods of political transition change the location of the 
jurisprudential spaces in which federal courts may freely operate, the 
relative autonomy of each elected branch of the national government 
tends to maintain the size of that space over time.  Any event that 
pushes all elected branches of the national governing coalition in one 
general direction is likely to push federal courts in the same direction 
at, perhaps, a slightly slower speed than one branch and a somewhat 
faster speed than another.  The federal legislature, federal executive, 
and federal courts were all more committed to racial equality in 1965 
than in 1945, although different events played crucial roles in the 
evolution of each branch.  By the time all relevant elected institutions 
can be aligned against the old Court, the same forces that produced 
this new electoral majority are likely to bring forth a new Court, 
whose positions are within the new jurisprudential space generated by 
the new partisan configuration. 
Separated institutions moving at slightly different speeds in 
somewhat different directions help explain why the elected branches 
of national government did not unite in common opposition to 
Marshall Court politics until the Marshall era ended.  During the early 
years of the Jackson presidency, most southern Jacksonians 
challenged federal judicial power, but almost all northern Jacksonians 
supported the Marshall Court.  Native American concerns aside, 
President Jackson remained on the sidelines.  The result was a 
stalemate, with a slight movement away from Marshall orthodoxy 
once Henry Baldwin was appointed to replace Bushrod 
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Washington.340  Jackson could be said to have become truly 
committed to what is now considered the Jacksonian constitutional 
revolution only in 1832, with the veto of the National Bank Bill.341  
During his second term of office, he was joined by many free state 
Democrats who adjured their former support for the national bank and 
protective tariffs.342  William Johnson’s death in 1834 further 
weakened National Republican influence on the Supreme Court, but 
Whig control of the Senate prevented Jackson from nominating Roger 
Taney to that judicial vacancy.343  After Jacksonians triumphed in 
midterm Senate elections, they soon found themselves with an 
additional two judicial openings—Marshall and Gabriel Duvall—to 
fill.344  At the moment when, for the first time, all three branches of 
the national government were controlled by Jacksonians committed to 
abandoning the central constitutional themes of the Marshall Court, 
Joseph Story was the only Justice left standing who articulated that 
jurisprudential vision. 
Separated institutions moving at slightly different speeds in 
somewhat different directions also help explain failures to curb 
judicial power during the most momentous political transitions of the 
twentieth century.  The New Deal empowered liberals in the 
executive branch of the national government but did not change the 
character of Southern Democrats in Congress.  The Confederacy rose 
again when Franklin Roosevelt proposed packing the Court in 
1937.345  As Kevin McMahon details, “The Court-packing plan was 
the last straw for many congressional southerners who were already 
unnerved by the elimination of the two-thirds rule, the [P]resident’s 
increasingly progressive positions, and the addition of black 
American voters to the Roosevelt coalition.”346  Fearing the 
appointment of racial liberals, conservatives in the Senate preferred 
preserving the judicial status quo to increasing presidential influence 
on judicial decision making.347  After World War II, fragmentation 
sustained judicial power after the country moved rightward.  Lyndon 
Johnson exercised considerable power as Senate Majority Leader by 
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inhibiting conservative attacks on a more liberal Supreme Court 
during the 1950s.348 
The same political phenomenon has sustained judicial power for 
the past forty years.  After 1968, Great Society policies were stalled 
or abandoned in dribs and drabs, with governing institutions 
becoming more conservative at significantly different speeds and at 
different times.  Such liberal judicial opinions as Roe v. Wade were, 
nevertheless, immune from conservative attack because Democrats 
controlled the House of Representatives until 1994, the Presidency 
from 1992 until 2000, and the Senate from 2000 until 2002.  When 
Republicans finally gained control of all three elected branches of the 
national government in 2002, the federal judiciary had become as 
much a political ally as an oppositional force.  Two Reagan judicial 
appointees, Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy, were the 
swing Justices.  A conservative icon, William Rehnquist, was Chief 
Justice.  During the previous decade, the tribunal he led had proved as 
willing to engage in conservative activism as liberal activism.349 
The perfect storm may hit as a consequence of the 2008 national 
elections.  Fairly liberal Democratic Party majorities now control all 
three elected branches of the national government.  The median 
Justice, Anthony Kennedy, is a conservative Republican.  A fair 
possibility exists that President Obama and the Democratic Congress 
will pass legislation regulating matters that the judicial majority 
insists are constitutionally reserved to the states.  Should the Roberts 
Court aggressively seek to constrain this emerging dominant national 
coalition, Obama and his allies may be compelled to contemplate the 
political actions necessary to weaken judicial authority over official 
constitutional meanings. 
The “multiple, incongruous authorities”350 that constitute the 
American regime nevertheless counsel against predicting a repeat of 
1936.  While the predominant winds for the past forty years have 
blown in a rightward direction, prominent countercurrents have 
influenced all elected branches of the national government in ways 
that shape the present federal judiciary.  The Clinton interregnum 
 
348 See POWE, supra note 338, at 238. 
349 See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE 
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATIVISM 199–253 (2004). 
350 ORREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 48, at 108. 
 2009] James Buchanan as Savior? 155 
generated two moderately liberal Justices.351  Justice John Stevens is 
the residue of liberal Republican influence on the judicial selection 
process during the 1970s.352  Democratic majorities in the Senate 
from 1986 until 1994 both prevented the confirmation of Robert 
Bork353 for the seat Justice Kennedy presently holds and almost 
certainly inhibited the first Bush administration from nominating a 
more reliable conservative than David Souter.354  To the extent 
President Obama insists on a radical departure from inherited 
practices, he is likely to encounter opposition from moderate 
Democrats who will regard the Roberts Court as an ally in their effort 
to prevent politics from moving too far to the left.  In short, the 
dynamics of the political universe in 2009 are as likely as in the past 
to ensure that federal courts will move within, rather than without, the 
jurisprudential space created by the ongoing motion of fragmented 
institutions. 
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